Mathematical tools and budgetary mechanisms for hospital cost control by Valor Sabatier, Josep
MATHEMATICAL TOOLS AND
BUDGETARY MECHANISMS
FOR HOSPITAL COST CONTROL
by
Josep Valor Sabatier
Ingeniero Industrial,
Universidad Politcnica de Barcelona (1976)
Ph.D. in Operations Research,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1981)
SUBMITTED TO THE HARVARD-MIT DIISION OF
HEALTH SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF SCIENCE
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 1985
Copyright (c) 1985 Josep Valor Sabatier
The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part
Signature of Author 
Certified by
Certified by
Accepted by
I - - -
Harvard-MIT livision of Health Sciences and Technology
Jurle 3, 19,85
-- .- /
Barbara J. McNeil
Thesis Supervisor
Regina E. Herzlinger
Thesis Supervisor
,, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .. .. _ _
Ernest G. Cravalho
PartmenttGNLRmittee
PLOUGH LIBRARN
-2-
MATHEMATICAL TOOLS AND BUDGETARY MECHANISMS
FOR HOSPITAL COST CONTROL
by
Josep Valor Sabatier
Submitted to the Harvard-MIT Division of Health Sciences
and Technology on June 3, 1985 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Science.
Abstract
This thesis is concerned with hospital cost containment, in particular, how variance-based budgeting
(arrived at via mathematical optimization) can be used to introduce incentives for cost containment
and standardization of care without putting the institutions at an inordinate level of risk. The
importance of the variance-based allocation techniques introduced in this thesis is highlighted via
numerical illustrations that use real hospital cost data. The methodology relies on the probabilistic
characterization of the resources needed to treat patients, and produces budgets that offer the
decision maker a set of options related to the maximization of utility functions. The probabilistic
characterization of resource consumption is approached by evaluating several patient classification
techniques that have been recently developed and that have not been compared using real cost data.
This thesis presents numerical evidence for the great variability of resource usage within DRGs and
for the power of severity-based subclassifications as variance reducers.
The problem of multi-facility resource allocation is also addressed. Two multi-facility efficiency
measures are compared and evaluated with data from a nonprofit chain. Also, a model describing
the effect of medical teaching programs on the staffing loads is developed and evaluated with data
from the same nonprofit chain.
The research uses real-life examples to show that the risk profiles of different clinical services in a
hospital (and of different hospitals in a system) vary widely. Consequently, it is proven that classical
budgeting methodologies used as cost-control mechanisms seriously deviate from goals of overall
minimum risk and utility maximization. These objectives are achieved with the use of the variance-
based algorithms developed in this thesis.
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Title: Professor of Management
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Hospital costs have skyrocketed in recent years, increasing annually on the
average of 17.5% since 1979, three times faster than the rate of inflation. In 1982,
hospital costs accounted for two thirds of the $50.9 billion expended by Medicare,
amounting to a bill of more than $3 billion per month. This level of spending has
brought the Medicare fund to the edge of bankruptcy. Congress has reacted to this
grim situation for hospital costs by enacting legislation that mandates a prospective
payment method for Medicare (the so-called Diagnosis-Related Group prospective
method). The major effect of this legislation is that hospitals must now care for a
patient within a limited budget, because they are not able to bill for individual
services provided on the basis of the costs incurred.
In the light of this budgetary crisis, the purpose of this thesis is to develop a
strategy for resource allocation that takes into account factors that have previously
been ignored by classical budgeting methodologies.
These factors are:
* Randomness of the patient-care process. Two patients seemingly alike
may use different amounts of resources. Accounting for different
resource usage was not important in the past because hospitals could bill
whatever costs they incurred while taking care of a patient.
* Lack of reliable cost data. Under a fee-for-service reimbursement policy,
hospitals adjusted their charges to meet "bottom line" requirements, not
necessarily in accordance to real costs.
* Lack of a coherent unit to measure hospital output, therefore making it
impossible to perform productivity studies. Traditional measures used
have been bed-days of care and total number of discharges, clearly
ignoring issues of intensity of care and diagnosis.
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* Few measures of the efficiency of the units budgeted. In a fee-for-service
reimbursement system it was not necessary to consider the global
efficiency of the hospital as long as it could produce tests and services
cheaper than the reimbursement fee.
* Lack of recognition of budgeting as a cost-control measure.
The resource allocation methodology developed in this thesis will be first
introduced with mathematical rigor and then applied to two real-life situations: (1)
a teaching hospital, where the services of the Division of Medicine will be budgeted,
and (2) a noprofit chain, where resources across 160 hospitals will be allocated.
Although all the above factors have influenced the general structure of the
methodology, its value with respect to hospital management and cost control is
stressed throughout the thesis by discussions regarding its implications on the
following issues: (1) Inherent variability of resource usage in the patient care
process, (2) Importance of physician behavior in cost control, (3) Multi-institutional
budgeting, and (4) Patient classification techniques.
Inherent variability of resource usage in the patient care process:
The variability of the resources needed to perform a given task is one of the most
challenging aspects of hospital management. In contrast to other industries where
usage (and therefore costs) can be predicted with accuracy, a hospital cannot
predict the costs of "producing" an item like an appendectomy.
The two numerical examples presented in this thesis demonstrate how budgets
vary from intuitive allocations when the budgeting process benefits from
information related to the randomness inherent to the health-care process. The
insights gained from these examples will help the understanding of how to introduce
incentives for cost containment without putting the hospitals at inordinate levels of
risk.
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Importance of physician behavior in cost control: One of the
implications of DRG-based reimbursement is that managers will need to be involved
in the cost-benefit analysis of patient management and that physicians will have to
get involved with the financial aspects of hospital management. This can be done
by properly using the budgeting process within the hospital. When properly
applied, budgeting is the instrument that brings together financial aspects of the
hospital and patient management issues.
Multi-institutional budgeting: When finite resources have to be allocated
among hospitals that use different combinations of inputs and discharge different
numbers of patients from different Clinical Services, decision makers are faced with
the problem of determining the relative efficiency of each institution. This is a
problem known in the Operations Research literature as multiple input - multiple
output efficiency measurement.
Measuring efficiency in hospitals is particularly difficult because institutions
that have multiple outputs and multiple inputs are very difficult to compare. This
thesis will evaluate two different measures of efficiency, based on mathematical
programming, recently introduced in the literature. The evaluation will be made
both at the theoretical level and at the practical level using real data from a
nonprofit chain of 160 hospitals.
Another aspect of the budgeting of systems of hospitals is the impact of
medical education in the productivity of the institutions. This thesis will analyze,
with a simple model, the effect of medical-school affiliation on the staffing levels of
our chain of 160 hospitals, and will make recommendations for extending the study
to areas of hospital management other than staffing.
Patient classification techniques: Defining measures of hospital output
that are consistent with resource usage is essential for resource allocation and
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productivity measurement. A number of techniques have appeared in the literature
in the last few months that attempt to define classes of patients with uniform
resource usage per admission. This thesis will evaluate the effectiveness of two of
the more frequently used systems (Severity of Illness Index and Disease Staging) as
variance reducers.
PLAN FOR THIS MANUSCRIPT
Chapter 2 is the bibliography review. Chapter 3 introduces the data that are
used for the numerical examples. These data come from two different sources, a
teaching hospital and not-for-profit chain. In order to preserve confidentiality, we
will refer to the single hospital as Hospital X, and to the chain as Chain Y.
Chapter 4 develops the mathematical model for resource allocation and
evaluates different patient classification methodologies. Chapter 5 presents the
numerical example allocating resources to the different Clinical Services of the
Division of Medicine of hospital X. Chapter 6 deals with multi-institutional
budgeting, and examines two different efficiency measures. It also develops a model
for the relationship between teaching loads and productivity, and presents the
numerical results of using the techniques introduced in chapter 4 with data from the
Y chain. Finally, chapter 7 has a summary of the results and topics for future
research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review.
2.1 Reimbursement in Health Care
This section will survey the methodologies used to reimburse health care
institutions: reimbursement of charges, establishing fixed rates for each service
provided, establishing fixed rates per diagnosis, and global budgeting. Particular
emphasis will be devoted to the newly developed fixed-price Diagnosis-Related
System adopted by Medicare.
2.1.1 Classical Methods
In this chapter, the term "classical methods" is used to denote two distinct
reimbursement strategies (1) fee-for-service, either hospital charges or predetermined
fixed fees, and (2) global budgeting.
Fee for Service: In a conventional fee-for-service environment, the hospital
bills the patient or the insurer for each service provided. When the actual amount
paid is the full bill, the reimbursement method does not provide any incentive for
real cost control by the provider and it is highly inflationary [9]. To counteract
these effects, policy makers developed the a priori rate setting strategy.
The concept of a priori rate setting for hospital services was introduced in the
late sixties, and from 1970 to 1975, the number of rate setting programs grew from
two to twenty five [9]. This reimbursement methodology is presently in operation in
most states. It differs from conventional fee-for-service form of reimbursement in
that providers are not necessairly paid the costs they actually incurred; in addition
-13-
they are not allowed to freely adjust their charges to cover their costs. Rather, an
external authority decides the maximum prices that providers are allowed to charge
for a specified service. This method provides some incentive to health care
professionals to operate efficiently within a given medical procedure or test, but it
does not make any attempt to reduce the number of medical acts performed during
an admission, be they necessary or not. From a financial optimization point of view,
if a given medical procedure can be performed with a cost below the reimbursement
rate by a physician in the office, he or she may have a tendency to carry out such
procedure without necessarily throughly evaluating its potential benefit. The same
phenomenon is also true for hospital-based procedures and tests.
There are a number of publications that deal with issues related to prospective
reimbursement. One is the book edited by William L. Dowling [28]; it provides a
number of examples of prospective rate setting in different states, as well as an
analysis of the responses and reactions of administrators and providers. The book
also details the management implications of fixed rates as well as underlines the
need of bottom-up information flow. Unfortunately, reference [28] (as well as all
other literature in this particular area), does not undertake the problem of resource
utilization. It examines only how regulators can set prices for medical acts and how
fixed rates influence the daily operation of the hospital1 .
1The effects of fee-for-service reimbusement are numerous. A number of studies have been
recently published on the subject of excessive utilization of ancillary tests and hospital days. Studies
ranging from 1966 to 1985 have highlighted the different practice patterns observed in the use of
tests and hospital resources [20], [291, [30], [43, [70j. Of interest is that none of these articles
mention the fact that one of the major incentives toward test overutilization may be purely
economical. For example, [431 goes as far as stating "three of the four hospitals reviewed were
found to have more than 30% inappropriate use of selected tests...", but does not make a judgment
regarding the causes of such a striking finding.
-14-
2.1.2 Global Budgeting
Global budgeting is a strategy used by governments in countries with very
regulated health sectors. Under this strategy, regulators assign to each health care
institution a fixed budget, under which the hospital must operate and provide
services during the budgeting period. Examples of this reimbursement policy span
all political systems, and can be found in socialist counties, traditional Western
democracies (Canada - Ontario [25]), right-wing dictatorships (Spain's General
Franco [3]) and U.S. agencies (Department of Medicine and Surgery, Veterans
Administration [62]). Particularities of the system vary across different countries,
but usually (1) there is a mechanism for appealing the fixed budget, and (2) yearly
"standard" adjustments are made to reflect the increase in prices of the different
inputs of the hospital.
Recently, Detsky et al. [251 compared the evolution of health care costs
between the United States and Canada's Ontario province and looked at the
evolution of hospital inputs from 1964 to 1981 in both countries. The results
indicate that the real inputs2 devoted to each admission increased 81% in the States
during that period whereas they increased only 13.9.% in Ontario. A similar result
was found for the ratio inputs/bed day of care. The aothors concluded that if there
is no decrease in quality of care, global budgeting does efficiently reduce the
total health-care direct expense. However, they acknowledged that Ontario lags
behind the States in the traditional measures of quality like the number of latest-
technology apparatus; the authors state: "Differences in health status would be very
difficult to demonstrate, given the problems associated with the current indexes for
measuring the health status of populations."
2Inputs were calculated as total costs in constant dollars, adjusting for different inflation rates in
each country.
_ ··_ 1___1__1
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2.1.3 Prospective Methods.
Strictly speaking, both fixing rates for specific services and a priori budgeting
described in the previous sections are prospective reimbursement methods.
Nevertheless, in practice in the USA today, prospective reimbursement is used to
denote the methodology by which a hospital is paid as a function of the discharge
diagnosis of the patient, regardless of the number or kind of medical acts performed
during the hospital stay. The available literature in this area can be divided into at
least two distinct areas: (1) studies of different alternatives for classifying patients,
and (2) studies of the impact of such reimbursement methodologies on hospital
management and financing. These areas will be discussed separately.
Different methodologies for patient classification. Before attempting to
pay hospitals as a function of patient characteristics, (e.g. discharge diagnosis) a
rigorous method for assigning those characteristics (labeling) must exist. This is
clearly the most important problem that a reimbursement method based on a single
price for a common type of patient faces. A detailed literature review of the most
commonly researched classification methodologies is presented later in this chapter.
Impact on clinical practices and management in the hospital. Stern
and Epstein [60] have recently reviewed the effects and incentives introduced by the
DRG prospective reimbursement system on medical practices. The authors conclude
that low payment rates per case foster, but do not guarantee, efficiency.
Omenn and Conrad [53], have discussed diseases for which both clinical and
surgical management protocols are available. They conclude that since
reimbursement for surgical DRGs seems to be more profitable at the current
Medicare rates than for surgical DRGs, the kind of therapy that hospitals will
provide may not be necessarily towards the less expensive DRGs.
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Other descriptions of the system have appeared in both specialized (medical)
and general periodical publications. Examples of the average level of such
discussions can be found in [44] in Medical Economics and in [45] in the New
England Journal of Medicine.
Of particular interest in the context of DRG-based reimbursement is the topic
of readmission rates. From a theoretical perspective Stern and Epstein [60] foresee
a great increase in the readmission rate of DRG reimbursed patients and a
deterioration of the quality of care, and suggest that a redefinition of the DRG
classification should be undertaken in order to attain more uniformity in resource
usage. In a recent empiric study, Anderson and Steinberg [5] show that during the
period 1974-1977, 22% of Medicare patients were readmitted within 60 days of
discharge. Readmission accounted for 24% of the total Medicare expenditures. If
this proportion were also true in 1984 (there are no data available yet) it would
represent a total of $8 billion for readmissions within 60 days of a previous
discharge. Similar results were found in a cross-sectional sample of patient
discharges in the state of Massachusetts [71]. Since the data in these studies came
before prospective-payemet was in place and hence before there were economic
incentives for readmission there is potential concern for worry as small increases in
readmission rates may not be detected by statistical analysis but will nevertheless
involve large sums of money.
Another possible change in hospital practices has been identified by Wennberg
et al. in [65], who reported that in the State of Maine there is a 3.5 fold variation in
the hysterectomy rates (1982 data) 3 . With such a wide variation in "common
medical practices," the authors argue that the DRG system is bound to move the
3 Similarly striking differences in the rate of some surgical procedures have been found in other
states and periods of time [61].
. .... ... _ 
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average toward the high-end of the spectrum unless some controls on admission
rates for specific diagnosis and procedures in terms of accepted practice patterns are
put in place.
An interesting concept of health care policy, related to the incentives
introduced by prospective reimbursement, is that of cost shifting, [19], [371, [50].
The cost-shifting phenomenon occurs when governmental agencies fail to fully pay
for the medical expenses of the medically indigent and underpay the services
reimbursed by Medicare/Medicaid. When hospitals see their income reduced, they
shift the cost of their operations to the "paying customer", the patient and, to a
large extent, the private insurer. This phenomenon, the references argue, is nothing
but a hidden tax on the people who hold private insurance, mostly the worker4 .
To conclude the analysis on the effects of DRG-based prospective
reimbursement, one can say that some of the effects which may be seen in the near
future are:
* Reduction of length of stay.
* Minimization of the number of procedures carried out within a given
diagnosis group.
* Minimization of the number of procedures per admission.
* Moving the admitted case mix towards better reimbursed diagnoses,
therefore, avoiding admission of expensive, long stay patients. Another
expression of this is a tendency to move hospitals toward specialization,
avoiding "unproductive" patients altogether.
* Increasing the number of admissions of the same patient for the same
4It should be mentioned here that since patient-specific real-cost data are rarely available, there
are no hard data supporting the fact that Medicare reimbursement rates are in fact below the
marginal costs of treating their patients. In fact, it may be possible that Medicare is supporting
hospital activities other than patient care. When patient-specific cost data from a number of
institutions become available, these issues will be able to be rigorously explored.
_ ____
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illness.
* Moving patients toward more "rewarding" diagnosis related groups,
even if this implies the performance of elective surgery.
* Performing cost-shifting to non-prospective paying clients.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the expected benefits of a diagnosis-related
prospective reimbursement plan are enormous. Until the appearance of such
strategies, there had been no other mechanisms that provided any incentive to
reduce the length of stay in the hospital or the number of procedures performed
[54]. It is also clear that we may be replacing the "overtreating / overtesting"
syndrome with the "overadmitting / undertreating" syndrome, and mechanisms
have to be devised in order to monitor the operation of the hospitals heavily
influenced by the new reimbursement policy. As R. Platt [54] recognizes, these
"bad" incentives are going to be minimal if the dollar amounts that hospitals
receive are close to the real costs of their operation.
Summarizing the recommendations of the articles referenced above, we can
say that for the DRG-based reimbursement system to perform as expected, it is
critical to:
* Know the true costs of a given DRG both across patients and across
hospitals.
* Obtain "good" DRG-based classifications that have low variance.
* Move to an all-payers system to avoid cost-shifting.
* Have the proper mechanisms to reimburse teaching institutions the costs
incurred by teaching programs (optimally, these mechanisms should be
disconnected from the reimbursement of medical care per se).
* Develop appropriate mechanisms for the payement of capital
expenditures, so that quality of care and technological innovation are
maintained.
-19-
2.2 Resource Usage, Accounting, and Budgeting in Hospitals
2.2.1 Background
Health care institutions are notorious for their lack of product-related usage
and accounting data. This state may be the result, in large part, of the fact that
hospital administrators did not need to know in detail the use of their resources on
a patient population basis. Charged costs were routinely shifted (usually up) to
match the real cost of the operation of the hospital as a whole. Moreover, the
presence of rate setting and the establishiment of maximum prices for the
"products" sold, and protection from competition as a result of certificate of need
further decresed the incentives for developing accurate cost accounting systems.
2.2.2 Estimation of Resource Utilization in Hospitals
Keeping reliable information about the real resources that patients have used
is essential for the production of case-mix based reports and for tight management
control [7]. Unfotunately, published empirical literature on resource consumption on
a DRG basis is sparse.
C.T.Wood [66] in describing the system at the Massachusetts Eye and Ear
Infirmary illustrates the kind of organizational structure and information system
that has to be developed in order to perform adequate management control. The
paper stresses the point that it is essential not only to record the counts of each test
and service rendered to a patient, but also that it is necessary to have a set of
weights (called Relative Value Units -RVUS) that allow the comparison of different
tests and services. These comparisons must be made in terms of the real resources
needed to perform such tests and services; therefore, these weights are based on all
direct costs chargeable to each test [52], [66].
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In the context of resource utilization, the notion of standards of practice
should be mentioned. Except in very specialized fields, (such as Oncology, where
treatment protocols are published in the literature), there is no readily available
information regarding what tests and procedures are acceptable for each particular
medical problem. Blue Cross and Blue Shield have started to addressed this issue
via their Medical Necessity Program [10], [11]. Under this program, guidelines for
the use of diagnostic imaging and respiratory therapy were recently established.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, as stated in [10] and [11], will implement these
guidelines via "the initiation of educational programs to familiarize health care
professionals with them. There will be no reduction in benefits or immediate denial
of claims for suscribers". These guidelines were developed in collaboration with the
American Colleges of Physicians, Surgeons and Radiologists.
2.2.3 Accounting and Budgeting
The literature is prolific with books related to hospital accounting. A very
good example is the two-volume text by Robert Broyles [17]. The first volume is
devoted to financial accounting. The second introduces managerial cost accounting,
and a number of examples of disease costing are provided. In this work, it is implied
that in order to allocate costs to diseases, all data regarding every procedure and
resource utilization (as it relates to a cost center) must be available.
Both the medical and managerial literature, [53], [69], have started to stress
the necessity of incorporating physicians into the hospital management control
system as the key to cost-containment efforts. In an article by Young and Saltman
in the Harvard Business Review, [69], the following disaggregation of hospital costs
is suggested: (1) case mix, (2) number of cases, (3) inputs per case, (4) inputs unit
price, and (5) input efficiency (i.e. how efficiently a test or procedure can be sed
I- -
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for patient diagnosis and/or management). Physicians, the authors argue, can exert
some control over all components, and have exclusive control over some of them,
particularly 3 and 5. Therefore, it will be necessary to incorporate physicians into
any cost-containment program that the hospital is going to undertake 5.
Physician involvement and decentralized management have been incorporated
into a novel hospital-management structure adopted by Johns Hopkins Hospital [401.
Under this system, Hopkins shifted operating responsibilities and financial
accountability to the clinical departments. These departments (such as medicine
and gynecology) behave as independent centers inside the hospital, which acts as a
corporate holding. Each functional unit is headed by a physician chief to whom a
nursing director and an administrator report. These three people function as a
management team and are responsible for the financial accountability of the unit,
including services purchased from other units such as the ancillaries and
housekeeping. This system has been effective involving physicians in budgeting and
management. The process is now evolving to budgeting both revenue and expense
by case or DRG [40].
Also worthy of mention is the effort by the American Hospital Association
[4] to introduce cost accounting into the hospital management scene. In this
publication, building from very elementary accounting definitions, the necessity of
good cost accounting is emphasized, and a methodology for implementing it
proposed.
Incorporating physicians into management decisions is in complete accordance with traditional
management control practices. As early as 1975, Anthony and IHerzlinger [6j wrote: "The
responsibility structure should correspond to the formal organization units; i.e. the responsibility
centers that carry out the programs," therefore implying that physicians (the heads of the
responsibility centers) should be involved in managerial decision making.
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2.3 Effect of Teaching Programs in Health Care Institutions.
The effect of teaching programs in health care institutions has been the
subject of extensive study in recent years. Before starting to review the literature, it
should be recognized that most of the studies that have been published state that it
is very difficult to isolate the effect of teaching programs from other factors that
affect hospital productivity; eg., urban location, state-of-the-art technology, and
sicker patients.
Most published studies attempt to quantify the relationship between costs and
the sizes of the teaching programs. In general, researchers have addressed this
problem via comparative studies of productivity between teaching and non-teaching
hospitals (or teaching and non-teaching floors in the same hospital). The results of
most of these studies indicate, as expected, that there is higher consumption of
resources in teaching than in non-teaching hospitals [48], [57]. Reported differences
in utilization range from 14% to 60%. It must be said, though, that these studies
are by and large limited to a few diagnoses and that all use charges rather than real
costs. The only study that uses real costs comes from the British National Health
Service [31]. In this study, it is reported that, in the aggregate (without case-mix
adjustment), the increased expense of teaching hospitals compared with non
teaching hospitals of the same characteristics ranges from 20% to 100%; these
results are consistent with charge-based data from the United States.
A second set of studies is represented by the recent paper by Garber, Fuchs
and Silverman [36]. The authors state that even though charges are higher in the
teaching compared to the non-teaching floors, most of the variance can be explained
by controlling for DRG and severity, and that the residual cost variance is due to
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higher lengths of stay and use of ancillaries related in the teaching service6.
Given that about half of the costs in health care institutions are related to
personnel, a basic question that also has to be answered but that has been mostly
ignored by the literature is how do physicians, house officers, nurses and other
health-care personnel relate to each other during the educational process? Usually,
house officers are taught by staff physicians, but the house officers also produce
patient care services that would otherwise have to be provided by the teachers.
Moreover, house officers do most of the teaching to undergraduate medical students,
who in turn produce some nursing services.
Quantifying these relationships is essential in order (1) to be able to have a
complete picture of the effect of teaching programs in hospitals, and (2) to be able
to perform productivity analyses. HCFA (Health Care Financing Administration)
has studied this issue, and preliminary results seem to indicate that, everything else
being the same, there is about a 5.79% increase in indirect costs for each 0.1
increase in the number of residents per bed [47]. Staffing aspects of teaching
hospitals are addressed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
Teaching institutions and DRG-based reimbursement: Medicare
distinguishes two classes of costs related to graduate medical education: Direct and
Indirect. Direct costs are mainly resident salaries and teachers time. Indirect costs
are the higher patient care costs incurred by hospitals with medical education
programs [47].
The reimbursement of direct costs did not change when the DRG legislation
was enacted, and it remains essentially proportional to the size of the teaching
6 There is one study that concluded that there is no difference in the ancillary use between
teaching and non-teaching institutions [121.
_I _ _ _ _ _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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programs. The reimbursement for indirect costs is done by Medicare via the indirect
teaching factor. This factor (an adjustment to the DRG rate) is a number coming
out of a complex formula that takes into account the location of the hospital,
prevailing wages in the area, and the number of residents per bed. The particular
formula was arrived at via a political "adjustment" that doubled it from the
statistical analysis that had been performed to estimate it [47]. It is unclear at this
point what the future holds for teaching adjustments, since there is a bill before
Congress that, if passed, will remove educational adjustments by 1987 [1].
2.4 Efficiency Measurements in the Health-Care Sector
A detailed bibliography and discussion of different efficiency measures that
have been used in the health-care sector is presented in the introduction to Section
6.1 later in this thesis.
2.5 Patient Classification Techniques
The literature has been prolific with reviews of various classification methods.
Since they have to be used as payment devices, they all attempt to provide uniform
resource utilization while maintaining some degree of clinical relevance. The patient
classification methodologies that have been developed fit into two categories: (1)
those that subdivide the whole patient spectrum (DRG, Medical Illness Severity
Grouping "MEDISGRPS 7" and Patient Management Categories) and (2) those
whose major goal is to subdivide patients that may have similar diagnosis into more
clinically relevant groups (Disease Staging and Severity of Illness Index).
'MEDISGRPS is a trade mark of MediQual Systems Inc.
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2.5.1 Diagnosis Related Groups
DRGs were developed by the group of R.B. Fetter at Yale University.
Initially, they were intended to be a tool for quality assurance review, and they were
modified and expanded under the auspices of the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) to be used for Medicare as a form of diagnostic-specific
prospective reimbursement, [33], [34], [35]. As they are currently used by Medicare,
the DRG classification consists of 470 classes, exhaustive and mutually exclusive
with respect to the types of patients seen in an inpatient unit. In order to classify
patients, DRGs use a number of variables, both clinical and demographic, like
Principal Diagnosis, Surgical Procedures, Presence or Absence of
Complication/Comorbidity, Age, and Malignancy.
The design objective for the development of DRGs was the creation of a
clinicaly relevant patient classification that would reduce the observed variance in
patient care costs and lengths-of-stay. Two data bases were used for the research:
320,000 discharge summaries from the Commission on Professional Hospital
Activities (1979) evaluated for lengths of stay, and 334,000 discharges from the New
Jersey State Department of Public Health evaluated for individual patient costs.
Clustering techniques and variance reducing analyses both interlaced with the
clinical judgment of a panel of experts were used to create the current groups.
DRGs have been found only to reduce variance from 20% to 40% in hospital
charges across various institutions [421. This is comparable to the results described
later in this research, where cost data were used (80% of the institutions are
between 20% and 50% Reduction in Variance). Computer programs that perform
DRG classification (groupers) from the Uniform Hospital Discharge Data [26] are
widely available commercially.
A more detailed description of the Diagnosis Related Groups system is found
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in the article [35] in Medical Care.
2.5.2 Medical Illness Severity Grouping "MEDISGRPS"
MEDISGRPS is a method of classifying patients into severity groups on the
basis of admission data rather than hospital stay or discharge diagnosis data.
MEDISGRPS was introduced by Brewster et al. [16], and can be used, according to
its developers, to classify the whole patient population across diagnosis for
management control purposes, or to refine the DRG system to obtain classes with
smaller variances.
As described in [16] the properties of the MEDISGRPS classification
methodology are:
* It classifies hospital patients into severity groups based on key clinical
findings present at admission (first 48 hours in the hospital).
* It can measure change in severity during hospitalization.
* It uses objective clinical findings (both physical exam and laboratory
tests) as the basis for classification and measurement.
* It controls for initial severity, thus demonstrating the effect of medical
practice on quality and cost outcomes.
MEDISGRPS has 5 severity categories: (0) no findings, (1) minimal findings,
(2) severe or acute findings, (3) severe and acute findings, and (4) critical findings.
When used across all patient diagnoses, the researchers in [16] report that they
obtain significant p values when comparing the average charges in each severity.
MEDISGRPS severity was used to refine two DRGs (DRG 122 - Circulatory
Disorders with Acute Myocardial Infarction without Cardiovascular Complications,
and DRG 140 - Angina Pectoris). The results indicate that again, MEDISGRPS
II _11__ I ____
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severity is able to differentiate average usages. Also, the reduction in variance 8
obtained when subdividing the 2 DRGs in the study by MEDISGRPS severity was
25.4% and 22.8% respectively.
MEDISGRPS has been computerized, but it requires that the information be
entered into the computer in a specific manner, and therefore imposes some burden
to the medical staff. To overcome that problem, MEDISGRPS developers
recommend the use of an integrated medical information system marketed by the
same company.
2.5.3 Patient Management Categories
Patient Management Categories (PMC) is a classification methodology
developed by the Health Care Research Department of Blue Cross of Western
Pennsylvania under a grant from the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) [68]. Characteristics of this patient classification include:
* Patient types were defined within disease or disorder groups by
physician panels.
* Levels of severity are incorporated into the definition of the different
classes.
* The class in which a patient will fall is not affected by the sequence of
diagnoses (primary versus secondary).
· Single disease patients having multiple related diagnoses are
differentiated from co-morbid cases (cases with more than one disease or
pathological condition).
PMC is a classification which is meant to be applied to the whole patient
8 Reduction in Variance (RIV) is a measure of the ability of a classification technique to explain
some the dispersion of an observed variable. Oo implies that the classification does not explain any
of the observed variance, and 100% RIV implies that the classification explains it all. RIV will be
formally introduced and used extensively in chapter 4.
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population, and it tries to represent clinically distinct patient types, each requiring a
different diagnostic and treatment strategy of care.
The definition of the categories was done in two steps: first, physician panels
grouped patients in clinical terms; second, the resulting groups were characterized
with their International Classification of Disease Code (ICD-9-CM) [27] diagnosis
and procedure codes. Statistical considerations were not used in order to obtain
minimal (or reduced) variance groups, as the physician panels were not provided
with any cost data.
To this moment, there has not been any published report of a comprehensive
study on the power of the PMCs as reducers of variance of hospital costs. Research
is underway in Pensylvania to evaluate PMCs versus DRGs using this and other
measures of classification effectiveness, and some critics argue that the fact that
they are based in specific treatment paths may discourage the development of
alternative treatment modalities [49].
Patient Management Categories are fully computerized, and patients can be
classified using the Uniform Hospital Discharge Data [26].
2.5.4 Disease Staging
Staging is a measure of the severity of a particular clinical episode. It was
introduced by J. S. Gonnella in 1983 [38], [39], and it borrows from the concept of
staging widely used in oncology9 . Levels of severity have been developed by
Gonnella et al. for 420 major disease entities plus 20 residual categories. The 440
classes span all possible diagnoses. The major disease categories have been found to
9In oncology, patients are staged as a function of a series of clinical findings specific for each
disease or pathological condition. Stage, in oncology, has been found to be very well correlated with
prognosis, and is the base for many management decisions.
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account for about 80% of all hospital discharges in a mixture of hospitals [8].
The methodology classifies patients in one of four stages (except in oncology
where stages range from I to V, V=Death):
* Stage I: Conditions with no complications or problems of minimal
severity.
* Stage II: Problems limited to an organ or system; significantly increased
risk of complications.
* Stage III: Multiple site involvement; generalized systemic involvement;
poor prognosis.
* Stage IV: Death.
Staging has been found to correlate with increased hospital charges and length
of stay in several studies (see [81 for a summary), but there has not been a
comprehensive study comparing the 440 diagnoses with staging versus the DRG
system in terms of cost predictability and reduction in variance.
Patients can be staged automatically by computer as the algorithm only uses
data contained in the Uniform Hospital Discharge Data [26].
2.5.5 Severity of Illness Index
The Severity of Illness Index has the same goals as Disease Staging: uniformity
of resource usage within each class. This Index was developed and introduced by
Susan D. Horn in 1983 [42], [41], and it is a four-level index determined from the
values of seven variables related to the patient burden of illness. The variables used
to assign severity are:
1. Stage of principal diagnosis (unrelated to the Disease Staging described
above).
2. Concurrent interacting conditions that affect hospital course.
I_ I _____
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3. Rate of response to therapy or rate of recovery.
4. Impairment remaining after therapy for the acute aspect of the
hospitalization.
5. Complications of the principal diagnosis.
6. Patient dependency on hospital facilities and staff, and
7. Extent of non-operating room procedures.
The classification can be expanded from four severities to twelve by
subdividing each of the four original classes into three, according to the extent of a
possible operating-room procedure (no procedure, moderate procedure, and intense
procedure). This expansion is called Procedure-Adjusted Severity Index.
The Severity Index has been compared to DRGs, Staging, and Patient
Management Categories for some specific diagnosis in several institutions [42]. The
results indicate that Procedure-Adjusted Severity has better reduction in variance
power that Staging and Patient Management Categories in three out of four
hospitals analyzed. The average coefficient of variation1 0 obtained by subdividing
the patient population by Procedure-Adjusted Severity is reportedly smaller than in
any of the other subdivisions, including DRGs.
As can be seen by the description of the variables used in determining the
index, Severity is a very subjective variable, and it has to be encoded manually by a
rater going through the medical record. This presents a serious drawback for ease of
implementation, expense, and cross-institution comparisons.
1 0Coefficient of Variation is the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean.
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Chapter 3
Data Sources
This chapter presents a summarized description of the data sets used for the
numerical examples in chapters 5 and 6. The detail of the descriptions that follow is
bound, in large part, by the restrictions of confidentiality imposed by the teaching
hospital X and the chain Y in order to make the data available.
3.1 Teaching Hospital X
Hospital X is a 450 acute-care hospital associated with a leading medical
school.
Since 1983, hospital X has in operation a computerized management
information system that captures all costs for each patient throughout his/her
hospital stay. The data made available for this research was directly extracted from
the management information system, and can be classified into two categories, (1)
clinical information, and (2) usage and cost data.
3.1.1 Clinical Data
The clinical data consists, for each patient discharged in Fiscal Year 83, of an
extract of the System for Uniform Hospital Reporting [26] containing the patient's
age, sex, hospital service that admitted him/her, hospital service that the patient
was discharged from, total length of stay, length of stay in any of the Intensive Care
Units, principal and secondary diagnoses (ICD-9-CM coded) [27], and all procedures
that the patient had (also ICD-9-CM coded). The DRG, the Severity of Illness
Index, and the Disease Stage (all as described in Chapter 2, bibliography review) of
*---"----*r~~~--·---------^-----------"--- ~ ~ -
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each admission were also provided.
3.1.2 Usage Data
As a result of the integrated medical information system in operation in the
hospital, the usage by patient of each ancillary service is recorded in terms of
Relative Value Units (RVUs). A RVU is a dimensionless quantity assigned to each
test or procedure that a laboratory produces, and it is proportional to the real
amount of resources spent to perform the test. For example, in the radiology
department, RVUs are assigned to each examination as a function of the X-ray film
surface, technician time, value of the machine used to perform the exam, and
average time that a radiologist needs for the interpretation of the films.
The function of the RVUs is to allow, within each laboratory (or, using
hospital's X nomenclature, in each Intermediate Product Producing Unit IPPU), the
computation of a single number reflecting the different services provided to a
patient. RVUs are not necessarily consistent across different laboratories. For the
department of nursing (which is an intermediate-product producing unit), the RVUs
are the number of bed days in each service or ICU.
At the end of the fiscal year, the RVUs that each IPPU has produced are
costed by dividing the total number of RVUs produced by the total expense
incurred. This computation allows a true a posteriori costing of all patients
discharged by the hospital. These costs need not have any relationship with the
amounts patients are charged. For billing purposes, the amounts used for each test
range from historical inflation-adjusted prices to pre-negotiated Blue-Cross rates.
The hospital administrators hope to switch to a cost based pricing scheme in the
near future.
Logarithms versus raw data. Hospital resources usage data are inherently
I ·I _I______
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skewed. For example, Figure 3-1 presents the cumulative distribution of the
Radiology RVUs (solid line) used by patients in DRG 125 -Circulatory Disorders
without Acute Myocardial Infarction with Cardiac Catheterization- and its
lognormal approximation (dotted line). The X axis is the total number of radiology
RVUs, and the corresponding value in the Y axis is the number of patients that had
that many RVUs or less. The distribution is quite skewed; while 90°% of the patients
had 250 RVUs or less, the remaining 10% used as many as 1200 RVUs. Although a
simplistic approach would assume that the patients in the high usage range are
outliers, and they should not be considered members of the same patient population,
a maximum likelihood lognormal model fits the observed data well, as the high users
fall inside the tail of the theoretical distribution. Because the data are lognormally
distributed, their logarithms are normally distributed 1 12].
The lognormality of this example is not particular to DRG 125. As a
quantitative measure of the lognormality of data distributions we can use a measure
of the normality their logarithms. Such a measure is the normal score which gives
the probability that a sample comes from a normal distribution, [55j, [56]. We
computed such probabilities for all DRGs in hospital X using as observed variable
the logarithm of the Total-Direct Patient-Care Cost (the same tests could have been
run for each set of RVUs). From the results we could not reject for 242 DRGs out of
the 342 DRGs 12 the hypothesis that total costs come from a lognormal distribution.
llFor many statistical tests where it is assumed that the observed phenomenon is a fixed value
modified by a random error, it is necessary that the data follow a normal distribution [2'3]
12 Only 342 of the possible 470 DRGs had more than 10 patients; they represented 77% of all
discharges.
___
-35-
3.2 Chain Y
The not-for-profit hospital chain Y consists of 160 hospitals located around the
United States. The data that were made available to carry out this research from
Fiscal Year 1983, and came from two primary sources: (1) discharge abstract
summaries (DAS), and (2) general ledger (GL). The chain does not keep patient-
specific data at the level of detail described in the previous section for hospital X.
3.2.1 Patient Discharge Summaries
The discharge summaries generated by the medical and administrative staff
upon a patient's discharge from a hospital of chain Y are computerized and stored
in what is internally called the Discharge Abstract Summary.
Each of the 160 Y hospitals is requested to submit an array of information for
each patient who is discharged to the DAS data system. The information that is
provided includes all of the data elements in the System for Uniform Hospital
Reporting [26], and many other pieces of information.
The following data elements are included in the DAS: Patient Name, Hospital
and Service giving the Care, Social Security Number, Age, Sex, Admission and
Discharge Dates, Primary, Principal, and Secondary Discharge Diagnoses, Operating
Room and other Procedures Done, and DRG. Although all these data elements were
made available for this research, only DRG, length of stay and information about
the hospital giving the care were used.
The DAS has been traditionally used to prepare National Reports of Y
hospital use. More recently, the DAS has become an important source of
information for planning and resource allocation purposes. The DAS data system
will accept data from the hospitals throughout the year. The corporate data
_ II--II Ill-----LII -i__-__il
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processing center creates and maintains quarterly and cumulative files for the
current year, a complete file for the previous year, and a cumulative history file for
all previous years.
The data system has a thorough editing and checking process at the data
entry end to insure that data items are consistent with each other; for example, it
checks that a date field has a valid date in it, that a diagnosis field has a valid
ICDO-CM code in it, or that the discharge date is not prior to the admission date.
The few formal studies of the reliability of the data in the DAS have routinely
exposed a 5%-7% transcription error after all checks and edits. They have also
shown that a large variation in judgment as to the primary or principal discharge
diagnosis. While this variance is large, approximately 30%, it is consistent with
other studies performed by similar chains [24], and does not seem to affect the case
mix measurement of the facility. Thus, although the principal diagnosis of 30% of
the patients may differ among observers, the differences in DRG assignments are
much smaller.
3.2.2 General Ledger (GL)
The GL is the data system which reports hospital expenditures for each
hospital in the system. The accounting system in Y is build around programs and
cost centers. A program is an organizational unit that provides service to the public.
Of all programs, only medical-care programs and educational programs are of
interest in this research. Programs use resources from the cost centers. For example,
program "Surgical Service" will use some resources from cost center "pharmacy".
There are around 30 medical care programs and 200 cost centers in chain
Y. The largest programs are Inpatient Medical Service, Inpatient Surgical Service,
Inpatient Psychiatric Service, and Outpatient Medical Care, accounting for $3.9
lbll ___
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billion of the $5.5 billion total annual direct and education expenditures incurred in
fiscal year 1984.
Cost centers are categorized into direct and indirect. Direct costs centers are
those associated with hands-on patient care, while indirect cost centers are
associated with the general operation of the hospitals, such as building management.
In order to identify the programs' use of the funds allocated to the cost
centers, the managers of the cost centers are asked to report on the distribution of
their expenditures across each medical care program at the end of every quarter.
These reports account for salary and non-salary expenses, as well as capital
acquisition expenditures. The direct cost centers also indicate the proportion of their
expenditures which are in support of the education and research missions of the
hospital.
For ancillaries, the proportion of dollars spent in each program can be
estimated exactly (for example, the radiology chief can determine quite accurately
how much of his/her expenses were used to serve Surgery). Ancillaries and
pharmacy expenditures account for $0.96 billion, (24%) of the direct care
expenditures. Similarly, the Nursing Service can report exactly the distribution of
its expenditures because in each hospital the Nursing Services know exactly for
which clinical service the nurses are working. Nursing salary costs represent $1.5
billion, (38.4%) of the total direct care expenditures of $3.9 billion.
In contrast, for some cost centers and some types of expenditures it is not
possible to have accurate knowledge of the distribution of expenditures. The
Department of Medicine, for example, must report the proportion of their salary
dollars spent in support of educational programs. Since there is no exact record of
the time physicians spent teaching versus taking care or patients, the reported
number is only an estimate. These less "accurate" funds accounted for 3.75% of the
Il(·IIB··LI··IDI) ---
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direct care expenditures in fiscal 1984.
It is clear from the preceeding discussion that there is some uncertainty as to
the accuracy of some of the numbers in the General Ledger. Nevertheless, since the
hospital is asked to distribute all of their expenditures, and since this total number
can be known accurately, there is a "bottom line" accountability to the GL report.
Chapter 6 will describe in detail the particular data fields from the General
Ledger used to develop the model described there.
I _ I __
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Chapter 4
Resource Allocation in Hospitals.
General Development.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the basic methodology for probabilistic resource
allocation in health care institutions. It is divided into two parts. First, it describes
how budgets could be used to introduce the necessary incentives for cost-
effectiveness when allocated to Clinical Services (section 4.2) and introduces the
concepts (1) of probabilistic budgeting with two mathematical formulations and (2)
the utility of patient classification schemes which reduce expenditure variations
(section 4.3). Then, in sections 4.4 to 4.6, it explores the validity of the DRG
system as a method for classifying patient discharges in uniform sets, and uses the
Severity of Illness Index and Disease Staging to obtain better patient classifications.
The data for the empirical analysis comparing these two patient classifications come
from the sources described in the previous chapter.
4.2 Budgeting by Clinical Service versus Budgeting by Ancillary.
Traditionally, hospitals have budgeted their operational resources using as
budgeting units the centers that produce tangible patient care services, such as
ancillary services, nursing, and pharmacy. Because the cost of taking care of
patients depends both on the number and cost of tests and procedures, budgeting
these units addresses only half of the problem of cost containment. Even if
optimally used, budgeting by ancillary service only applies pressure to the
_ ------l---L-_llll__
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laboratory to become more cost effective in the production of its tests, which is not
sufficient for overall cost control. If reduction in health care costs is to be attained,
both components of cost, (1) the number of tests and procedures, and (2) their costs
must be controlled.
Alternatively, budgets in health care institutions should be allocated to
Responsibility Centers13 which are fully responsible for the care of patients and the
use of resources, namely to the Clinical Services. Allocating resources to Clinical
Services requires a measure of the productivity of these Services. This production
measure has to be equivalent to the resources needed to produce such units of care.
Thus, patient discharges would not be a good measure of production because
different patients may use different resources, and specifying only the number of
patient discharges does not necessarily correspond to the actual activity of the
department. It is important to differentiate among classes of patients based upon
their different resource requirements. This consideration points toward finding
uniform patient classifications.
Switching the budgeting emphasis from the ancillaries to the Clinical Services
responsible for patient care and resource-utilization decisions is in full accordance
with practices used in all branches of industry, manufacturing as well as service,
and for-profit as well as non-profit organizations.
Budgeting by Clinical Services presents several problems not encountered in
traditional ancillary budgeting. Most of them are related to the fact that Clinical
Services have to reimburse laboratories for the services they provide, and therefore
a pricing mechanism for intermediate products must exist. This can be solved by
13A Responsibility Center is an organizational unit that bears responsibility for certain decisions
within an organization. A responsibility center may or may not be considered a cost center or
budgeting unit.
 ___
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adopting a scale of Relative Value Units that would allow tests performed for a
given laboratory to be compared with each other in terms of the amount of
resources they use. Being able to compare all tests within a laboratory allows a fair
pricing strategy, in which the cost of each test is in fact proportional to the real
resources involved in carrying it out.
Budgeting by clinical service presents the problem of costing intermediate
products. Since laboratories (and services like nursing) have to be reimbursed for
the utilization that the Clinical Services "bought" from them, it is necessary to
know the prices of these goods a priori.
A result of the cost cutting pressures introduced by having the Clinical
Services "pay" for the goods and services used from the ancillary departments is
that some Clinical Services could decide to do business with laboratories other that
those in the hospital (either independent or from other hospitals). Even though
doing business outside the hospital would reduce operating costs in the short run for
the clinical service making such a decision, it would introduce a number of
interferences to the normal functioning of the institution. Among others, it would
(1) reduce the workload in internal laboratories and may threaten their very
existence, forcing all services to use outside services, (2) the operating costs of
laboratories so affected would have to be shared by the rest of the hospital, and (3)
delivery of health care would be impared if emegency laboratory services were not
available in house.
To solve this problem, institutions can use a two step pricing procedure for
intermediate products [22]. Clinical Services are charged a share of the fixed costs
of the laboratories and other intermediate-product producing units, regardless of the
number of services they use from them. This ensures that Clinical Services will have
an added incentive to "buy" services from the laboratories in the hospital as they

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are supporting their fixed costs regarding of volume.
4.3 Probabilistic versus Deterministic Budgeting.
The amount of resources that a given budgeting unit will require in order to
perform a given activity can seldom be estimated without error. This is particularly
true in the case of hospital budgeting. Costs in hospitals are influenced by the
diseases of the patients treated (case mix), the practice patterns of the physicians in
charge of these patients, and the costs of performing each of the units of service
(tests, operating room procedures, etc.) used to treat each patient. Even within this
framework of variability, in practice, managers do allocate resources according to
the expenses incurred during the previous budgeting period. This commonly used
budgeting technique is equivalent to performing budgeting according to the latest
observation of the random variables involved in the process. Another common-
practice technique uses historic data from more than one year. If expenses over
various past periods are taken into consideration during the budgeting process, the
procedure is equivalent to budgeting by expected values.
Budgeting by expected values is in principle a reasonable thing to do.
Statistically, if the decision could be made a large number of times, the average
dollars spent would be the expected value, but in a budgeting situation where the
budgeting decision is made only once, consideration of information other than just
averages is of major relevance in the decision criteria. Budgeting by expected values
assumes also that the decision maker is unbiased with respect to any particular
department who may run out of money.
A number of different approaches are open to the resource allocator when the
whole probability distribution functions of the forecasted expenses are available.
One plausible strategy would be to allocate resources so that the expected values of
(_
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the extra resources needed by each budgeting unit will be the same. Another would
be to use a "minimax" technique, by which the maximum chance of needing more
money would be minimized. The utility profile and risk aversion profile of the
decision maker can be incorporated in all these alternative methods. These
strategies are formally introduced as particular cases of a general resource allocation
methodology based on value functions in the following sections.
When the budgeting scope is shifted from the hospital level to the multi -
institutional level, the issues of lack of bias and risks of underbudgeting gain special
significance. If the office in charge of allocating the resources to different
institutions has reason to believe that some hospitals are less efficient than others, it
could be argued that the inefficient institutions can be penalized by increasing their
chances of running out of money. In other words, one can envision a system in
which one of the incentives given to inefficient facilities to motivate them to
improve their performance is increasing their level of risk. Issues of efficiency
measurement are discussed in chapter 6.
Since the total operating money that a given budgeting unit will require for a
budgeting period is a random variable, it can be represented by its Probability
Distribution Function (PDF) or its Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). The
PDF and CDF for the Hematology/Oncology Service of the Division of Medicine
hospital X are presented in figure 4-11 4 . It indicates that the most likely estimate of
the total dollars that Hematology/Oncology will need is 2.65 million, the 50 percent
point. The probabilities of deviating from this most likely (expected value) total
expense can also be read from the plot: the chances that the total budget will be
14A Gaussian model has been used to make this plots. This is a reasonable choice since the
random variable of interest is the sum of a large number of random variables, the costs of each
patient in the service. The parameters of the Gaussian distribution are computed using the
methodology described later in this section.
1 __1__1_1_____________III___L_________
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Figure 4-1: Probability and Cumulative Distribution Functions
of the Total Budget
Hematology/Oncology Service, Division of Medicine
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Figure 4-2: Probability Profile (CDF) of the Total Budget
All Services - Division of Medicine
Probability of Over Budgeting.
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smaller than 2.5 million are only 17'%, and that it will be smaller than 2.8 million,
80%. The probability of any other total expense can also be easily derived from
figure 4-1.
When curves similar to those in figure 4-1 are available for all budgeting units,
resource allocation can be carried out taking into account the risks to which each
different unit is subjected. The set of CDFs for the Division of Medicine of the
hospital is presented in figure 4-2.
4.3.1 Probabilistic Budgeting. Theoretical formulation.
As a general theoretical introduction to probabilistic resource allocation, the
following definitions and assumptions are necessary:
1) There are N budgeting units to which resources have to be allocated. For
each unit (i, i=1,2, . . . N), the decision maker has available the a priori probability
distribution function of the expected need for resources during the budgeting period
fi. We will use t i to denote the actual expense incurred (a quantity that will be
determined a posteriori and that follows the distribution fi), and bi to denote the
allocated (budgeted) amount to each unit i.
2) The value to the system (or to society, or to the decision maker) of
budgeting bi dollars to budgeting unit i can be measured by the real valued function
vi(bi), provided that all resources are used for operational purposes. Assume also
that similar functions can be derived for all budgeting units, that is, v exist for all
i=1,2, · · · ,N.
3) If the budgeting unit does not need all the resources allocated to it because
the incurred expense, (the realization of the random variable "total cost" ti) is
smaller than the budgeted amount bi, then the value to the system is not the
allocated budget vi(bi) but that of the resources in fact used v(ti).
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These value functions vi also have some other names in the utility theory
literature - ordinal utility functions, preference functions, worth functions, or utility
functions [46]. Note that these value functions, as they may be different for each
budgeting unit i, can be adjusted to incorporate the preferences of the decision
maker. Subjective preferences will be introduced later in this section in the context
of efficiency measures.
Under these assumptions, the statistical expected value of the value function
of a particular budget {bi, i=1,2, . . . ,N} is:
N b.
E E [ilbi = ] vi(t) fi(t) dt + Vi(bi) fi(t) dt]
i1 ti=1 t
The left hand side of the equation reads as the expected value to the system
given that bi dollars were allocated to unit i. The right-hand side has two terms, the
first one accounts for the possibilities of overbudgeting, and its integral term is the
contribution to the expected value of the cases in which the needed resources t were
smaller than the allocated bi. In this case, the argument of the value function vi(. )
is not the allocated dollars but the dollars used. The second integral covers the cases
where the observed need is beyond the budgeted amount bi; here, the argument of
the value function is always bi since all allocated resources are used in all cases of
underbudgeting.
If the total resources available for allocation are B, it can be argued that the
decision maker will allocate that amount in such a way that the value across all
budgeting units is maximized. In other words, he will solve the mathematical
programming problem:
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N
MAX E [vilbi P1
i--1
subject to:
N
b < B
i=l
bi > 0 i=1,2...N
In the next section it will be shown how two different choices for the set of
functions v i lead to very plausible resource allocation strategies.
4.3.2 A Risk-Minimization Procedure
An obvious choice for the value functions vi(x) is the linear function vi(x)=x,
the same for all units. In practical terms, this is equivalent to saying that the
decision maker gets more utility as the units get more money, independently of
which unit gets it, as long as that money is used. In other words, he is indifferent to
which budgeting unit gets each dollar if it is used, but dollars in excess have no
value to the system.
With this choice of value functions, the expected value for a generic unit i
transforms to:
b. - ob. 00
vi(t) fi(t) dt + v i(bi) fi(t) d = t f(t) dt + bi fi(t) dt
b /00 co o
-- O 't fi(t) dt + bi fi(t) dt + t fi(t) dt- t fi(t) dt =
=1 t fi(t) dt - (t- b) fi(t) dt = - (t- b) fi(t) dt
i t
where i is the expected value of the PDF fi a constant independent of the budget
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decision b..
Then, the objective function of the allocation problem (P1) evolves to:
N
E [vIlb]= -AX Sl -
i=1
b (t- bi) fi(t) dt] =
s
N N 
MAX E Ai- MIN E (t-bi) fi(t)dt
i=-- i=- i
Since the first term is a constant, the resource allocation problem reduces to:
N
MINE
i=1
(t - bi) fi(t) dt
i
P2
subject to:
N
5 b < B
i=1
b. > 0 i=1,2,.. N
Here, each term of the sum in the objective function is the expected lack of
resources (risk) to be incurred by each budgeting unit i when allocated bi, and
therefore, this problem is in fact minimizing the expected total risk across the whole
set of budgeting units.
N
MIN 5 Risk(bi)
subject to:
N
E bi < B
t -i=1
bi > 0 i=1,2,-. N
For the case of a Gaussian probability model, the expression of the risk for
N
i=1
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budgeting unit i, which total cost has an average of i and a standard deviation of
a. when allocated b. dollars is:
2 dtt L* (t-,t)Risk (bi) =fe 2 a dt
This mathematical programming problem is a Knapsak problem with non-
linear objective functions. Although the solution of such a problem is generally
complex, for the case of convex objective functions efficient algorithms have been
developed [15]. This case of probabilistic budgeting, where the objective function is
in fact the sum of integrals of Probability Distribution Functions, falls into the class
of convex objective functions.
4.3.3 A Mini-Max Algorithm
Another plausible value'function vi(.) to be used in the resource allocation
model is the following:
vi(t)=1 if bi t
vi(t)=0 if bi < t
In other words, the value of a given budget to the system is 1 if enough
resources were allocated to the unit, and 0 if the unit did not have enough. A utility
function such as this is equivalent to the decision maker trying to minimize the
number of units that will need more money, being independent of the actual
expected amount of overexpenses; the only relevant fact in this value function is the
fact that a unit needed more money, this has value zero; otherwise, the value is one.
With some algebraic manipulations like those in the previous section, it can be
easily shown that such a value function reduces the problem of resource allocation
(P1) to the following:
I-
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MIN AIMX Fi (bi ) P3
subject to:
N
Zb. < B
i--1
bi > 0 i=1,2,. ,N
where the maximum chance of needing more money is minimized.
Here, again, the functions F(.) are the Cumulative Distribution Functions of
total expenses for budgeting units i, i=1,2,... N. The solution of this Mini-Max
mathematical program can be obtained in a variety of manners. The simplest,
specially in a budgeting application in which the problem only has to be solved a
few times (at the beginning of each budgeting period) and therefore solution time is
not a major concern, is based in sequential allocation. This algorithm is as follows:
one starts by allocating to each budgeting unit the expected value of its total
expenses. This gives to every unit a fifty-fifty chance of needing more resources.
Then, if the total allocated budget is smaller that the available dollars, one keeps
allocating one dollar at a time to the budgeting unit with the largest probability of
needing more resources until there are no more dollars to be allocated. In the case of
a tie, the dollar in contention goes randomly to any of the units that tied (this will
effectively break the tie for the next allocation).
In the case that the base budget (sum of expected values) is larger that the
total available dollars (- Nil bi > B), one has to remove dollars from the
allocated budget until the total budget becomes feasible. This is done by removing
the next dollar from the budgeting unit that has the smallest probability of needing
it. As before, ties are not an issue, since removing a dollar randomly from any of the
tied hospitals breaks the tie for the next step.
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Since this algorithm has a "resolution" of one dollar, it will not find the
budgets that exactly equate the risks. Nevertheless, one can see that the solution
can be as precise as desired,.being only a matter of using an allocation step as small
as necessary. Clearly, the computational effort needed to solve the problem
increases linearly with the accuracy of the solution.
Chapters 5 and 6 present numerical examples of probabilistic budgeting in
which this algorithm was used. As it will be detailed there, extremely accurate
solutions were attained with steps of one thousand of the difference between the
base (expected) budget and the total budget available.
4.3.4 Introducing Preferences and Weights in the Allocation Process
The algorithms described in the previous two sctions will effectively allocate
resources among the budgeting units according to a predetermined goal such as
total risk minimization or equalization of the probabilities of underbudgeting. The
decision makers may nevertheless want to use during the allocation process some
information regarding their own preferences toward different budgeting units or
regarding measures of performance that they may have available.
The use of the value functions described above allows very simply the
introduction of measures of efficiency or preferences. As an example, let us assume
that using some method the decision maker has calculated the relative efficiency of
all the budgeting units1 5. Let these efficiencies be called e < 1, i=1,2,. . N.
Making the assumption that everything being the same (same PDF), the value to
the system of giving an extra dollar to a hospital is affected linearly by its measure
of efficiency, the general resource allocation problem (P1) gets modified to:
15The numerical implementation that is presented in Chapter 6 introduces and discusses at length
how one goes about computing efficiency measures for a hospital system.
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N b. oo
~ MAX b e vi(t) fi(t) dt + ] evi(bi) f(t) dt P4
subject to:
N
E bi < B
i-
b. > 0 i=1,2. N
When the choices of value functions are the same that have been discussed in
the previous sections, the problems reduce to the same risk-minimization and
probability-equating methodologies, with the inclusion of the efficiency factors in
the objective function. In practice, the allocation will be modified by the efficiency
score in the sense that it will be more valuable to give dollars to the efficient
facilities than to the non-efficient.
4.4 Measuring Resource Utilization in Hospitals
The problem of resource allocation described thus far relies heavily on the
estimation of the operating costs of the different budgeting units for each budgeting
period. If a strategy based on the probability distribution functions introduced in
section 4.2 has to be used, it is necessary to estimate not only the expected expenses
but also other parameters required to define the shape of the distribution, most
commonly the variance or second moment. The validity of the budget obtained with
PDFs will only be as good as the precision with which the PDFs are estimated.
The cost PDF for each class of patients represents the variability of resource
usage of all the patients that belong to that class. If all the patients in a class used
exactly the same amount of resources, the PDF of total cost of the service (provided
that the case mix could be forecasted accurately) would be a number with zero
variance, and the budgeting process would be reduced to assigning the amolnts of
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dollars equal to the expected (now. without variance) costs.
A good budgeting method will have to be based on PDFs with small variances,
which in turn implies that it will require the definition of classes of patients that use
similar amounts of resources.
4.5 Estimation of resource usage with minimum variance.
There have been a number of attempts to devise patient classifications that
would reduce the variance of the resource usage within each class.
An ideal classification technique for budgeting purposes should have, among
others, the following two characteristics: (1) be objective and (2) not depend on the
actions of the physicians. Here, objectivity means that the classification should be a
function of some variables extracted from the patient record, without room for
personal judgment by the encoder. Independence of physician action would ensure
that the practitioners could not move patients from one class to another by using
more or less laboratory tests and/or procedures. The classification should depend
only on clinical and demographic variables.
The next sections describe the effect of DRGs, the Severity of Illness Index,
and Disease Staging as variance reducers when applied to cost and usage data from
the X hospital. Also, the variance reducing power of the DRG classification is
evaluated with multi-institutional data from the Y chain.
4.5.1 DRGs as Uniform Classes of Patients.
In order to design groupings of patients that use similar amounts of resources,
a reasonable start is to use those groups adopted by Congress for that same purpose,
the DRGs. As mentioned in the literature review, the main objective in the
I______
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definition of DRGs was the uniformity of length of stay and total charges within
each class [35].
The measure of the goodness of a classification as a variance reduction scheme
that has been used in the literature is the Reduction in Variance (RIV). The RIV is
a fraction that has as numerator the difference between the total variance and the
weighted sum of the variances in each class. The denominator is the total variance
(variance of the total population).
Variance using whole pop. - Variance using classification
Variance using whole population together
C
NX a 2 p - nca2 c
c=l-
NX a2
where N is the total number of patient discharges classified in C classes with
nc patients in each C -1 n-), 2 is the variance of the population as a whole
and 2 is the variance in class c. Since the weights are the number of patients in
each class, the RIV is computing the relative reduction in variance obtained by
subdividing the total population in disjoint classes.
The DRG system was used to reduce the variance of the estimates of total
cost in the two data sets that were described in Chapter 3. The results are
presented in figure 4-3 for hospital X and in 4-4 for the chain of hospitals Y.
The results for hospital X in figure 4-3 show that the maximum reduction in
variance in total direct cost when subdividing the patient population by DRG is
55%, obtained in the General Medicine service. The smallest reduction, 40%, is
obtained in the Renal service. These results imply that only half of the variance in
total-cost observed in the Division of Medicine of hospital X can be explained by
DRGs.
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Figure 4-3: Reduction of Variance in Total Costs when
Subdividing the Patient Population by DRG
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In contrast with hospital X, we do not have real cost dlata for each patient
from the Y chain. For the RfV studies that follow, the case-mix adjusted length of
stay was used as proxy for costs. This patient-cost proxy was calculated as follows:
(1) - It was assumed that for each DRG, the cost of a particular hospital stay
was directly proportional to the length of stay in days. This is a very strong
assumption, but if we take into account the fact that this proportionality has to
hold only within each individual DRG, it is not unreasonable.
- - --- --
0 
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(2) - Under this assumption, dividing the total New Jersey Medicaid dollars
that the whole system would input by the total number of bed-days provided (per
DRG), provides a system-wide average cost of the bed-day of care for a particular
DRG. Algebraically:
Ni X NJD.
System Average Cost per Day in DRG i = SC i = N
S LOS
p-=1
where N is the total number of patient discharges in DRG i, NJD i is the New
Jersey reimbursement rate for DRG i, and LOSp the length of stay of patient p.
New Jersey Dollars were used to be able to compare the resource intensity of the
different DRGs. The validity of the assumption comes from the fact that we are
using the total dollars used by the chain, and since DRG prices were set at the
average cost, when using large numbers of patients, differences of particular
discharges will tend to cancel each other.
(3)- With this nomenclature, the proxy for cost of a given admission of length
of stay LOS days will be LOSx SC. For the remainder of this chapter, we will refer
to this proxy as "cost" even that it has to be understood that it is only an
approximation.
The results in total cost reduction in variance obtained by classifying the
patient discharges by DRG in each of the 160 hospitals of the chain Y are presented
in the histogram of figure 4-4. Moat institutions (115) did not reach a 50%
reduction in variance. This result, consistent with others reported in the literature
( [59] [63]), makes questionable the validity of the DRG classification as a
methodology to reduce variance across many institutions.
This heterogeneity induces us to look for more uniform classification
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Figure 4-4: Histogram of Reduction of Variance in Total Costs
in the 160 Hospitals from Chain Y when
Subdividing the Patient Population of each Hospital by DRG
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techniques. Disease Staging (DS) and Severity of Illness Index (SII) are studied in the
next sections.
4.5.2 Other Variance Reduction Techniques. Applications.
Two problems can be identified with the use of DRGs for budgeting: (1) The
within DRG uniformity of resource usage is not very good, and (2) To use DRGs,
managers would have to come up with Probability Ditribution Functions for 470
classes of patients. In order to solve these two problems, this section analyzes
alternative classifications based in subdividing some DRGs with high volume and
- --
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heterogeneity and on aggregating some other DRGs. The value of this alternative
system as a variance reducing method is also evaluated.
Severity of Illness Index: As described in the literature review (section
2.6), the severity of Illness Index is an instrument intended to be used for defining
case-mix groupings of hospitalized patients.
In order to judge the effectiveness of the Severity of Illness Index as tool in the
prediction of resource usage and in the reduction of variance, we performed analysis
of variance and reduction of variance studies at two levels: within DRGs and across
the whole Division of Medicine. The results indicate that Severity effectively
differentiates classes of patients that use significantly different amounts of resources.
Figure 4-5 presents the analysis of variance regarding resource usage of the
Chemistry and Hematology laboratories and the Routine and Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) bed days of care for DRG 14 (Specific Cerebrovascular Disorders except
Transient Ischemic Attacks).
The analysis shown in the figure is interpreted as follows: for each category of
usage analyzed (i.e. Chemistry laboratory) there are five rows, labeled severity 0 to
4. The column labeled "Number of Patients" contains the number of discharges
that the hospital had of the specified severity within DRG 14.16 The columns
labeled Mean and Standard Deviation present the average and standard deviation of
the logarithm of the usage of Relative Value Units by each severity class.
Logarithms rather than the observed values were used in order to be able to
perform statistically correct tests. (See Chapter 3 - Data Sources- for a description
of the Relative Value Unit scale and a statistical justification of the Natural
16 Severity 0 was assigned to those patients that could not be classified by the encoder. The total
number of patients that fell into this class was small, only 3% of the patients in the division of
medicine. The size of this class was getting smaller during the year due to increase in expertise of
the encoders.
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Figure 4-5: Analysis of Variance of some Units of Service DRG 14
Classified by Severity of Illness Index.
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Logarithms as a valid transformation to obtain well behaved distributions of
resource requirements.)
The intervals on the right-hand side of figure 4-5 are the 95%o confidence
intervals of the mean. These intervals are computed using the standard deviation of
the whole population being subdivided (the whole DRG). This is necessary in order
to be able to draw statistical conclusions on the power of the classification to
discriminate between different levels of resource usage. For an in-depth, yet clear
explanation of analysis of variance techniques, see [51].
Note that with increasing severity, there is a consistent increase in the average
consumption of resources. Severity 4, which corresponds to critically ill patients,
does not follow this pattern because of shorter lengths of stay due to death. This
fact may explain why severity has failed in a number of instances to explain costs of
hospital admissions. When hospital costs are tied to length of stay, a practice still
common in the hospital management literature, severity will not be able to
differentiate usage. These results are constant throughout most of the DRGs that
we analyzed.
Figure 4-6 presents the results of analyzing the power of the Severity of Illness
Score and Staging17 as variance reducers. The efficacy of Severity (bar number 2)
versus DRGs (bar number 1) and Procedure-Adjusted Severity (bar number 3) in
reducing the variance of the total costs in the Division of Medicine were compared.
The measure of the efficacy of the classification is again the Reduction of Variance
described in the previous section.
Because since this is the Division of Medicine, only one patient had a
procedure of high intensity, and 42 out of 3733 had a moderate procedure. (The
1 7Staging results will be discussed in the next section
. = i ..... .~~~----
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Figure 4-6: Severity, Procedure Adjusted Severity, Staging, and DRG
as Reducers of Variance
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reduction of variance obtained by the Severity index is only 20%, all other services
in the Division of Medicine have RIVs around 40%.
When DRGs are subdivided by Severity, (generating a potential total number
of classes of 470X4), the reductions in variance obtained are extremely large, above
80% in all cases. This indicates that the heterogeneity observed within DRGs is due
in large part to the clinical situation of the patient. A valid criticism to the
subdivision of DRGs into severity classes is the large number of groups generated.
Section 4.5 will explore the possibility of using only a few DRGs subdivided into
subgroups, and considering all the remaining patients as belonging to a single class.
Disease Staging: The same kind of analysis was carried out for Disease
Staging. As an illustration of the methodology, Figure 4-7 presents the analysis of
variance for DRG 14 when subdividing the patient population by the Staging Index.
Here, we also observe some increase in use at higher (sicker) stages, but the
statistical significance is smaller than with the Severity of Illness Index. This lower
significance is found through all the DRGs that were analyzed.
Even though Staging does not discriminate as well as Severity among different
levels of resource usage within a DRG, figure 4-6 shows that it is a powerful aid to
DRGs as a variance reducer. The RIV obtained are almost as high as those obtained
with Severity. Note also that Staging alone, does much poorer that Severity alone,
because the stages for different basic diagnoses are not comparable. For example,
for most diagnoses the scale of Stages goes from 1 to 4, but for Oncology, it spans
from 1 to 5.
The conclusion of this RIV exercise with data from the Division of Medicine of
Hospital X is that Severity has better discriminatory and variance reducing powvers
that Staging, but the differences are not large. However, this poorer statistical
C_ _____
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Figure 4-7: Analysis of Variance of some Units of Service DRG 14
Classified by Staging.
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4 18 -2.595 3.079 (---*---)
--------------- ------------
POOLED STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.746 -2.0 0.0 2.0
ICU Bed Days (Logarithm of Number of Days)
F=6.87 INDIVIDUAL 95 PCT CI'S FOR MEAN
BASED ON POOLED STANDARD DEVIATION
Stage Number Mean Standard
Level Patients Deviation ------------ ---- 
1 2 -4.605 0.000 (-----------*------ -- )
2 41 -2.514 2.804 (--*--)
3 47 -0.470 2.943
4 18 0.340 2.464 (---*---)
---------------- +-------
POOLED STANDARD DEVIATION = 2.801 -6.0 -3.0 -0.0
Total Direct Cost (Logarithm of Dollars)
F=4.71
Stage Number
Level Patients
1 2
INDIVIDUAL 95 PCT CI'S FOR MEAN
BASED ON POOLED STANDARD DEVIATION
Mean Standard
Deviation
0.087
0.855
0.970
1.029
6.814
2 41 7.926
3 47 8.536
4 18 8.130
POOLED STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.933
(------------*----------- )
----------------------------
6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0
F-11.99
Stage
Level
1
2
3
4
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performance of Staging is outweighed by its objectivity and mechanizationl8.
4.6 Finding a Good Classification.
As we stated earlier, one of our main objectives is to estimate resource
consumption by a given patient case-mix with as little variance as possible. It has
already been shown how, by subdividing DRGs by severity or staging, the variance
of total costs can be reduced up to 80%. Here, we will explore other subdivisions.
The aim is to attain as good a RIV as possible with the smallest possible number of
classes.
To introduce our classification mechanism, let us examine two extreme cases:
on the one hand, if we take the entire patient population as a whole, without any
classification, the variance of the expected total cost is (N being the total number of
patients):
total cost =NX 2cost
In this expression 2ost is the variance of the distribution of costs of allcost
patients, 2ttal cost is the variance of the sum of N random variables with variances
2cost. This is a very large number, particularly given the heterogeneity of the total
costs in large numbers of patients. For the data from hospital X (14568 patients):
2cost =0.3138*108
and a2 =0.4571*1012total cost
acost= 5 601, and atotal cost=67 6 1 29
On the other hand, if we decide to classify the patient population in a number
of classes, each as homogeneous as possible, the total variance will be:
18As discussed in the literature review of chapter 2, Severity is considered to be somewhat
subjective and an expensive measure to encode [49].
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C
a2Total Cost -E nc c
c--= 1
where C is the number of classes, a2 e the variance in class c and n the number of
patients in class c. If the classes in which the population is being subdivided have
some homogeneity, the resulting variance will diminish as C increases. Nevertheless,
using a large number of classes is not desirable for budgeting purposes, since the
resource allocators would have to come up with prices for all classes, many of them
with very few patients.
In order to decide what the optimum number of classes would be, one has to
weight the obtained reduction in variance versus the added cost of manipulating
and costing large numbers of classes. The following strategy was devised to help
determine this optimum number:
1. Use only as few DRGs as possible. These DRGs should be those which
account for most of the cost of the Division.
2. Divide the rest of the population according to their indexes of severity or
staging.
3. Remove from each class, if necessary, those patients that fall into the
category of outliers1 9 and consider them a different class.
We will comment on these steps separately.
1) In order to determine the reasonable number of classes, the RIVs obtained
using a given number of DRGs were plotted against each other. The results for each
service are presented in Figure 4-8. DRGs were introduced in the classification
according to their relative contribution to the total cost of each clinical service.
2) The remainder of the patients (those that do not belong to any of the 85
1 9 Outliers will be defined later in this section.
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DRG mentioned above) are classified by their severity index.
In figure 4-8, each curve represents the evolution of the Reduction in Variance
of total costs obtained when introducing one DRG at a time. For example, at the 5
mark in the x axis, the corresponding RIV for each service was obtained using 24
classes: 5 DRGs subdivided by severity (5X4=20) plus four classes for the rest of
patients that do not fall in any of the 5 DRGs. The order in which the DRGs enter
the classification is the order in which they contribute to the total cost of each
particular service. The effect of classifying by severity the patients that do not
belong to any of the selected DRGs (as opposed to just considering them all in a
single class) reduced the variance of the estimates of total cost an average of 5%
across all bed sections in the Division of Medicine.
One can see that in all services except General Medicine, 10 DRGs are enough
to obtain all the reduction of variance that will ever be obtained. This maximum
attainable RIV was displayed in the histogram of figure 4-8, which displays' the RIV
obtained by dividing the population in 470 X 4 classes.
3) Selecting outliers is not an easy problem. In the health sciences literature it
is usually found that an outlier is defined as that observation that is located a given
number of standard deviations from the mean of the sample. Since this study is
based in Probability Distribution Functions (which by themselves model the whole
population, whether the observations are close to the average or far away), it was
felt that deciding an a priori cut-off value to consider observations as outliers was
inappropriate; instead the method introduced by Tukey [61] based in robust
statistics is recommended. This methodology does not require the setting of any
cutoff values.
The numerical examples that are presented in Chapers 5 and 6 were
performed with all patient discharges, without removing any observation.
_1_ -_1_I11III LL. 14-11_11111. L_.. _.
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Figure 4-8: Reduction in Variance versus Number of Classes.
Division of Medicine.
- - - - -.. .. . . .
/
I
I :
I' -:, 
.. ~.* ..
O
Number DRGs Used
General M.
......... Cardiology
Inf.Disea.
-.--... -Heme/Onc
....... GI
1.
0.
0.
0.
0.
R
I
V
0.
0.
0.
I' ^------------------`----"I----
,
I
I...... ..
!
_ _ -_ _ __ __ _
-69-
Chapter 5
Budgeting Within a Single Institution
Chapter 4 has introduced a methodology for accurately estimating the amount
of resources needed for a given budgeting period and a procedure for resource
allocation. This chapter focuses on applying this methodologies to the Division of
Medicine of hospital X. Section 5.1 discusses the relevant inputs and outputs of the
budgeting units and section 5.2 presents and discusses the numerical results.
5.1 Inputs and Outputs of a Large Teaching Hospital
5.1.1 Inputs.
For the pupose of our budgeting analysis, the inputs that will be considered
are the value of the reimbursement that the budgeting unit would generate during
the budgeting period. The numerical example that follows does not deal with the
process of defining the actual amount of dollars available for direct patient care in
the next budgeting period. Instead, we will assume that the total amount of dollars
that has to be distributed among the different budgeting units is a fixed percentage
of the sum of the expected expenses. This serves the purpose of focusing the
discussion on the differences in budget that various allocation techniques produce.
In a real situation, one would first compute the dollar value of the expected
income from the forecasted case mix and volume (the same case mix used to
compute the expected expenses), second, one would subtract from this expected
income the total indirect costs, and finally, the resulting amount would be allocated
using one of the methodologies described in the previous chapter.
 I __ ___
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5.1.2 Outputs.
The outputs of a large hospital affiliated to a medical school fall into at least
three categories, (1) patient care services, (2) teaching activities, and (3) research.
These categories will be discussed separately.
Patient Care Services: Although patient care services are the most tangible
outputs that the institution produces, they are not necessarily easy to define or
quantify. In most hospitals, the services provided are measured by the number of
tests, procedures and other medical acts performed. The production of the hospital
should be measured by the reimbursable unit, namely, the patient discharged with a
given diagnosis. Medical services and ancillaries (called intermediate products in the
data-sources chapter) must be recorded for internal accounting and compensation,
but the operational units that perform them should not be considered the budgeting
units.
Obviously, if hospital X were to sell services (intermediate products) to third
parties (as it could be the case of complex laboratory analyses that smaller hospitals
were not able to perform due to lack of equipment), then these particular
intermediate products would became units of output and the laboratory that
performs them could be considered a budgeting unit for the amount of resources
that these sales involve. In general these third party sales do not represent any
sizable amount of income.
Teaching: Teaching is a complex issue. Traditional criteria to measure this
output include the number of residents graduated and the number of undergraduate
medical students that took elective clinical curses in the hospital. Unfortunately,
there are a number of hidden costs that have to be accounted for when dealing with
a teaching institution. Usually, teaching hospitals incur in expenses like having a
larger library that they would otherwise have, running seminars, and holding
L PII ___ I ··-l-YII-I-II__L..___I__.
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rounds. These activities have an associated cost of resources and staff time. In
hospital X, these costs where all considered indirect, and therefore did not enter our
budgeting exercise. This is consistent with our goal of focusing only on budgeting
direct patient care resources.
Some health care administrators argue that teaching programs have an
associated cost stemming from the fact that some ancillary utilization is done solely
for teaching purposes. Since the expected costs in our budgeting example are
computed directly from utilization data collected the previous year, this increase
from the otherwise purely clinical usage level, if true, will be imbedded in the
observed values, and can be ignored provided that there is no change in the medical
school affiliation and the intensity of the teaching programs.
Chapter 6, which deals with budgeting a chain of hospitals from the
perspective of the corporate management, will analyze the increased personnel costs
incurred by teaching institutions. From the point of view of a single institution,
though, this problem is less relevant as long as the indirect costs are properly
accounted for.
Research: Because its complexity, research is probably easier to deal with
than any of the other two outputs. Research resources do not usually come from
the patient-care operational budget. In most institutions, as in hospital X, the
amount of time that the staff devotes to research is deducted from the total time
available for patient care. Similar procedure is followed for costs associated to house
keeping and building maintenance, where an overhead is charged to each research
project in order to reimburse the institution for these costs. In short, since our
concern in this thesis is budgeting for the patient care direct costs, research will not
be considered. Therefore, the only output from the -Division of Medicine that will
be considered are patients discharged.
_ _I_____
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5.2 Numerical Example
This budgeting example deals solely with the direct-dollars operational budget
of the Division of Medicine. It assumes that the manager in charge of the Division
has to allocate direct resources among the different Services that belong to the
Division (the budgeting units). Figure 5-1 presents the Cumulative Distribution
Functions of the expected total direct costs for all clinical services of the Division of
Medicine of Hospital X. These curves were computed by costing all patient
discharges via the real usage of intermediate products such as X-Rays and
laboratory tests. The empirical distribution of costs of each class of patients was
then computed, and a Gaussian model fitted. The number of classes of patients used
in each service was: 20 DRGs, each subdivided by 4 severity levels, and 4 severity
levels for the rest of patients that were not in any of the first 20 DRGs. (See
Chapter 4).
We observe that the highest expected total cost is that of the Cardiology
Service ($2.75 Million), closely followed by Hematology/Oncology ($2.6 Million).
The service with less total expected cost is Infectious Diseases ($0.9 Million).
The different slopes of the curves shoul be noticed. The slopes of the
Cumulative Distribution Functions are a function their variances. The distribution
with higher variance is Hematology/Oncology whereas general Medicine has the
smallest variance. Recall that these variances are computed using the classification
procedure outlined in the previous chapter, and therefore, about 80% of the
observed original variance within each service has been removed.
In order to illustrate how these curves would be used for allocating resources,
the assumption of an increase in budget of 10%o over the sum of expected values was
made. Figure 5-2 presents the budgets of all services with the aforementioned
_  __ _
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Figure 5-1: Cumulative Distribution Functions of Expected Total Costs in the
Division of Medicine
Probability of Over Budgeting.
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increase when the three methodologies introduced in Chapter 4 are applied: (1)
Least Total Risk, (2) Equal Probability of Underbudgeting, and (3) Proportional
Increase. The differences in allocated resources are better highlighted in the
percentual changes presented in figure 5-3. Figure 5-3 shows that services with high
variance (Hematology/Oncology, Infectious Diseases and Cardiology) are allocated
more resources by the risk and probability minimization algorithms that they would
get with fixed percentual increase across the board. The converse is true for services
with low variance (General Medicine and GI).
The explanation for this is straightforwardly derived from the definition of the
two allocation procedures described in chapter 4: if there is extra money to allocate,
as in this example, proportionally larger amounts of it will go to the budgeting units
that have larger variances in resource requirement.
If there were less money to allocate than the sum of expected values, then,
budgeting units with higher variance would lose more money (in relative terms)
than those with more tight expected usages. Again, this is due to the fact that units
with a narrow probability distribution function do have a very small chance of
deviating from the expected expenses.
This results highlight the point that when decision makers allocate resources
deviating from the expected budgets without taking into consideration their
inherent variability, they may seriously jeopardize the ability of the units with small
variance to function, as they will be more affected during budget cuts.
It should be reiterated at this point that all budget changes and variances that
have been mentioned so far refer only to operational budgets 20 and that we have
2Operational Budgets are those required for normal operation of the budgeting unit. Capital
investment in new machinery and other one-time expenses are excuded from consideration in this
numerical example
_I·___ __ ___1_1 I ·p 
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Figure 5-2: Budgets for Direct Expenses Using Different Algorithms. Division of
Medicine (10% Increase Over Expected Value)
Budgets for Direct Expenses Using Different Alogorithms
Division of Medicine (10% increase)
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Figure 5-3: Percentage Changes in Budgets for Direct Expenses Using Different
Algorithms. Division of Medicine (10% Increase Over Expected Value)
Percentage Change
Budgets for Direct Expenses Using Different Alogorithms
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not taken into account at any moment the possibility that the budgeting units could
change their internal functioning strategies.
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Chapter 6
Budgeting a System of Hospitals
This chapter deals with the problem of resource allocation for direct expenses
to the chain of hospitals Y introduced in chapter 3 (Data Sources). The budgeting
units that we will encounter in this chapter are the hospitals themselves, and we will
take the position of the corporate manager that has to allocate resources to each
individual hospital for the next budgeting period. Because there is no available
patient-specific cost data, the probability distribution functions of the estimated
resource needs for each hospital have been computed using case-mix adjusted length
of stay as a proxy for cost. The plan of this chapter is as follows: Section 1 will deal
with the issue of the effect of teaching programs in the teaching institutions of the
chain Y. Section 2 will describe two measures of efficiency of health care institutions
and apply them to the set of hospitals. Section 3 will present the results of using the
Risk-minimization and Minimization of Maximum Probability techniques introduced
in chapter 4 to the chain Y.
6.1 Efficiency Measures in Health Care Institutions.
6.1.1 Introduction.
Evaluating the performance of a hospital is a task which has been of great
interest to health care administrators, multifacility management groups, and
government. Since the advent of Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) as
reimbursement methodology, the need for measuring hospital efficiency has been
especially important for both government and hospital administrators. A few
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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performance measures have been developed in the past, specifically, ratios and
econometric-regression analyses. For an example see [32], where these classical
techniques are applied to the National Health System in England. These
approaches, although frequently used in practice, have serious drawbacks (see
[58] for a critique). Basically, Ratio Analysis fails to account for differences in Case-
Mix, and Cross-Sectional Econometric Regression Estimates provide average cost
functions, which are equally influenced by all institutions, efficient and inefficient
alike.
The focus of this section is two fold, first, it describes a technique for
detecting inefficient facilities called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and second,
after analyzing some of DEA's drawbacks, it introduces a variation of DEA based
on Multiple Objective Discrete Optimization, which eliminates some of them. Both
methodologies are applied to the departments of medicine of a set of 160 hospitals
from a not-for-profit chain, and the resulting pairs of efficiency measures are
compared. An effort is also made to explain the reasons for the observed
discrepancies.
The plan of this section is as follows: Subsections 2 and 3 introduce the basic
concepts of Data Envelopment Analysis and Multiple Objective Optimization
respectively. Subsection 4 compares both methodologies. Subsection 5 describes the
data sources used to evaluate the performance of both approaches. The results are
presented respectively in subsections 6 and 7. Subsection 8 discusses the differences
obtained in the results of the runs, and subsection 9 has the summary of the
conclusions and some final comments.
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6.1.2 Data Envelopment Analysis
This methodology was introduced in the late seventies [181 as a tool for
measuring the efficiency of decision-making units when faced with multiple inputs
and outputs. DEAL relies on the very strong assumption that the efficiency of a
hospital can be measured as the quotient of a linear combination of the outputs and
the inputs. Algebraically,
# outputs
Vi Yi
i-=1
Eff = (1)# inputs
Ei iX
j=l
The outputs (the y's) can be the number of patients discharged in a given
DRG (case mix), the number of residents trained, or any other "product" that the
hospital delivers. Examples of possible inputs (the x's) are Full Time Equivalents
(FTE) and Direct and Indirect expenses. The estimate of efficiency can be varied by
varying the weights (u's and v's). DEA computes the efficiency of each hospital
using the set of weights that MAXIMIZES the estimate of its efficiency.
In order to maintain the efficiency within a common bound, the methodology
also requires that for a set of weights to be valid, it should not make the efficiency
of any hospital greater than 1. That is,
# outputs
E Vi Yi
inputs < 1 For all facilities (2)# inputs
-j=1
One of the major advantages of DEA is that it simultaneously considers the
multidimensionality of the input and output spaces, without the need to know a
priori the relative weights that are necessary for ratio analysis and most types of
regression analysis.
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If after running DEA, using a set of data from a group of hospitals, one
institution has efficiency smaller than 1, the interpretation is that this facility is
relatively inefficient as compared with the others in the group. No matter which
other set of acceptable weights this facility had chosen, its efficiency ratio would not
increase.
The procedure provides the analyst with relative efficiencies for each facility,
rather that absolute measures of inefficiency. The relativeness arises from the fact
that all measurements are made with respect to the other hospitals in the sample,
and therefore, inefficiencies present in all facilities will never be detected.
For illustration purposes, let us explore the following example: Assume that 7
hospitals have the same amount of each input (Full time equivalents, Dollars, Beds,
etc.) and that their outputs are only two types of patients, patients types 1 and 2.
Since all the inputs are the same, any inefficiency can be measured by their outputs.
We illustrate this example graphically in figure 6-1.
In this simplified case with all inputs the same, the DEA analysis finds the
"Envelope" of the points (the dotted line of the figure), and labels the hospitals on
the boundary as being efficient and those in the interior as inefficient. The analysis
concludes that hospitals 1, 3, and 5, are inefficient when compared to the set 2, 4, 6,
and 7. The relative inefficiency of the inefficient hospitals is measured by the
distance from the location of the point to the efficient boundary.
6.1.3 Multiple Objective Optimization
Integer Multiple Objective Optimization efficiency measures are based on the
following definition [14]:
Let f 1(x),f 2(x),...fn(x) be n attributes of hospital x. For example, fi(x) could
be the number of patients of type i discharged per full time equivalent of employee
·----111_
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Figure 6-1: DEA Graphic Example
Patients 2
Type 2. 9.00+ - *
-1
_ic \
_~~~~~- \
6.00+
- 3
- * 55 \
6
3.00+ *
\ 7
0.00+ I -
--- +-------+------+------+-------------
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00
Patients Type 1
in hospital x, for i=1,2, * n.
A hospital x1 is said to be efficient with respect to the set of hospitals under
consideration if there is no other hospital x2 such that 21:
fl(X2 ) > f(Xl),
f 2(x 2) > f(Xl)
(3)
fn(X2) > fn(XI )
with at least one of the inequalities being strict. Loosely speaking, a hospital is
inefficient only if there is another hospital that is strictly better in at least one
criterion and not worst in all the others.
21In this notation, superscrips are the hospital indeces, and subscripts refer to each particular
output. For example, f(z") is the attribute 1 of hospital 2.
_
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Referring back to figure 6-1, where it was assumed that all hospitals in the set
of 7 used the same amount of each input, MOO will label as efficient hospitals
2,4,5,6 and 7, and inefficient 1 and 3. Note that in contrast with DEA, hospital
number 5 is now efficient, inspite of the fact that it is in the interior on the polygon.
This is a direct consequence of the definition of efficiency (3), which requires that in
order to label a hospital inefficient, another hospital discharging more of at least
one class and not less of each of the other classes must exist. In this case, neither
hospitals 4 or 6 satisfy this condition in relation to hospital 5.
When we have multiple outputs and multiple inputs, one can apply MOO by
constructing families of functions f(x),i=1,2,... n by expressing each of the n
outputs on a per unit basis of each of the inputs.
As with DEA, MOO locates pareto inefficiencies comparing hospitals with the
most efficient elements in the set, rather than being based on a mean or central
tendency relationship, which reflects a mixture of efficient and inefficient
institutions.
6.1.4 Contrasting DEA and MOO
DEA, as described in references [131, [18] and [58], does not deal with
discontinuities in cost functions; in practical terms, a hospital could be considered
inefficient as compared with another that uses the same resources and produces a
somewhat different case mix, even though the cost of changing the case mix to the
efficient one is enormous.
DEA can label a facility inefficient not only if it is "dominated" (i.e. another
facility provides more of at least one output and not less than any other output with
the same inputs or the same outputs with less inputs), by another facility, but also if
it is only dominated by a linear combination of facilities (what could be called a
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"mixture" of hospitals). In the graphic example above, facility number 5 is
considered "inefficient" by DEA although both facilities 4 and 6 have less of at least
one output. In many cases however, the transfer of resources from treating patients
type 1 to patients type 2 is not linear, and therefore, it may not be correct to label
facility 5 as inefficient. On the other hand, a facility such as number 3, can be
called inefficient since there are in the system other facilities that "produce" more
patients of both classes with the same inputs.
The situation of hospital 5 does not occur in MOO since this technique will
only label a hospital inefficient if there is another hospital that discharged more
patients of one type and not fewer patients of the other type.
However, MOO as described in section 3 can not deal with multiple inputs.
The nature of the algorithm does not allow a multidimensional input space. One
could circumvent this problem by defining a set of weights for the inputs, and
scaling the outputs by dividing them by the weighted combination of the inputs.
Alternatively, one can run MOO as many times as inputs are being
considered, dividing in each round the outputs by a different input. This provides
the analyst with a series of classifications. Facilities that are consistently efficient for
different inputs are candidates to be classified as efficient. For the numerical
example that follows we have used this second strategy. The reason is that it is
generally very difficult to obtain an appropriate set of weights.
Both DEA and MOO are very sensitive to data. For example, facility 7 is
called efficient because it produced the most of patients type 1. In fact, whenever
many outputs and inputs are considered, a facility will be considered efficient if it
happens to produce more than any other facility of a given output or use less of
some input (in DEA), or have the largest ratio output / input for some out)put and
input (in MOO). A facility with this characteristics will be labeled efficient
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regardless of its production and consumption relations in all other inputs and
outputs.
6.1.5 Description of the data set used.
The data used come from a non-for-profit chain of 160 hospitals. Of all the
departments in the hospital, the analysis was performed using data from the
Medical Services as opposed to the whole hospital; surgery, psychiatry and the
outpatient clinic where excluded because of the different nature of the services they
provide.
Inputs Used: Direct Full Time Equivalents (FTE), Direct Salary Dollars and
Other Direct Dollars attributed to the Medical Service were used. The data were
extracted from the General Ledger from Fiscal Year 1983. Indirect costs were not
used since they are often not under the control of the managers of the clinical
services [7]. We decided to use both direct salary dollars and Full Time Equivalents
in order to explore the effect of differences in the composition of the staff. The
variable FTE is not sensitive to different types of employees (physicians, nurses,
technicians, etc.) whereas Direct Salary Dollars are likely to reflect such differences
whenever they exist.
Outputs Used: The outputs of each hospital (medical services) were
measured as the number of discharges in each Major Diagnostic Category (MDC) as
reported in the discharge summaries. The MDC classification is a grouping of the
DRGs by organ system and/or group of diseases. Examples of MDCls are Number 2,
Disorders of the Eye, and Number 10, Endocrine and Metabolic Disorders. In the
hospitals analyzed, the DRG encoding is routinely performed by a single
organization within the system. This is important to ensure consistency in the
assignment of DRG codes.
i__CI___III______
Figure 6-2: First Quarter Fiscal Year 83 Patient Distribution
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We have reduced the number of MDCs from 24 to 15 by collapsing some
MDCs with a small number of discharges. The two histograms in figure 6-2 present
the distribution of total discharges (Quarter 1 Fiscal Year 83) in the whole system,
and detail the collapses made. The first column in the top histogram is the original
Major Diagnostic Category in which the patients were discharged, and the second
shows the recoding made. As it can be seen, some MDCs (like numbers 13 to 15
and 22 had less that 50 discharges each out of more than one hundred thousand.)
We have excluded the educational components both from the inputs as well as
from the outputs in order to compare the hospitals in a more uniform dimension
and prevent the problem from becoming overwhelmingly complex. The educational
status of a hospital should be taken into consideration before concluding on its
degree of efficiency or inefficiency.
6.1.6 DEA Efficiency Results.
Efficiency
0.00 - 0.25
0.25 - 0.35
0.35 - 0.45
0.45 - 0.55
0.55 - 0.65
0.65 - 0.75
0.75 - 0.85
0.85 - 0.95
0.95 - 0.99
Figure 6-3: Efficiencies as computed by DEA.
Number of
Hospitals
2 **
4 ***
6 ******
9 *********
13 ************
13 *************
2 **
0
Efficient: 102 *****************/ /****** (102)
A histogram of the efficiency measures as defined in (1) with consltraints (2), is
shown in figure 6-3. Note that 102 facilities were classified as efficient and 58 as
_ ______
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inefficient 2 2 . The details of the results obtained by running DEA with these data
are presented in appendix A at the end of this chapter.
It should be stressed that the only conclusion that can be drawn from this
exercise is that for each of the 58 hospitals with efficiency less that 1 there is no set
of weights u and vi that can make any of them efficient. They are either
dominated by a single hospital or by a combination of hospitals called efficient.
The Case Mix Effect. As mentioned earlier, DEA as described in [13],
[18] and [58], does not take into consideration fixed costs. One of the highest costs
in hospital-based health care is that of changing Case Mix since this usually involves
one-time large expenditures like new equipment and construction. In DEA practical
terms, a hospital labeled as inefficient could become efficient by treating more
patients of a given type (and probably could afford treating fewer patients of some
other type); in practice, this will only occur in the unlikely case in which the cost of
the switch is negligible.
In order to be able to use some of the results from DEA without having to
deal with fixed costs of this nature, we have grouped the hospitals according to their
case mix: for each inefficient hospital, the efficient hospital with the closest case mix
was identified. The measure of closeness (distance) in case mixes was taken to be the
Euclidean distance in the 15-dimensional space of the proportion of patients in each
MDC. If an inefficient hospital can be closely paired with an efficient one, it can be
said that fixed costs (as they refer to case-mix modifications) are probably not a
major issue. Appendix B presents the list of inefficient hospitals paired with their
closest efficient hospital.
2"Of the 102 efficient hospitals, 18 are in the efficient class due to the fact that they discharged
the most patients in one of the 15 MDCs or used the least of one of the 3 inputs. The rest of the
hospitals labeled efficient lie in the boundary of the multidimensional polygon as described earlier.
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As an example, let us analyze pair number 4, (hospital code 500 with
efficiency 0.49 and hospital code 586 with efficiency 1.00), the case mixes are
extremely similar (0.054 is the tenth smallest distance in the whole set of pairs
efficient-inefficient), and so are the total inputs. Since the case mixes are virtually
identical and the consumption of resources very similar, the inefficiency must come
from the output volume. It can be readily observed that hospital 500 discharged one
third the number of patients.
With this pairing, hospital 500 can not argue that the observed inefficiency is
due to different case mixes, since there is another hospital with the same case mix
using considerably less resources per patient.
6.1.7 MOO Results.
As stated earlier, Multiple Objective Optimization does not allow for multiple
inputs. In order to compute efficiencies in our real life data set, the program was
run three times, each time using as outputs the number of discharges in each Major
Diagnosis Category divided by each of the three inputs. The results of the three
runs are presented in Appendix A. Note that MOO does not give relative efficiency
values like DEA. MOO only provides the list of efficient and inefficient facilities.
Figure 6-4 shows a summary of the results. The column labeled "Combined" has as
efficient the hospitals that are efficient in all three runs.
When using MOO, one does not have to worry about the effect of case-mix
differences between hospitals called efficient and those called inefficient. As
described earlier, the term inefficient is used only for hospitals for which there is
another hospital that produces more of at least one type of output per unit of input
and not less of the other outputs per unit of the same input.
The high correlation between the results in the first two runs is to be expected
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Figure 6-4: Summary of Multiple Objective Optimization Results
Number of Facilities when using
Discharges/ Discharges/ Discharges/ Combined
Direct FTE Direct Salary $ Direct Other $
Efficient 61 65 34 29
Hospitals
Inefficient 99 95 126 131
Hospitals
since the number of full time equivalents is closely related to direct salary dollars.
We have observed the following fact: Of the 29 efficient hospitals, 7 are in the
Eastern part of the country, 20 in the Central section, and 2 in the West coast.
These numbers represent respectively 12.9% of the hospitals in the East, 31.3% of
those in the Central states, and 2.0% of the hospitals in the West. This result
coincides with the informal opinion of several specialists in the system under study
that North hospitals in the East and West coasts are less efficient than hospitals in
other regions.
6.1.8 Comparison of the DEA and MOO results with traditional
measures of efficiency.
Case-Mix Adjusted Productivity: A traditional measure of efficiency is
the ratio "production" to direct dollars. Since this measure is an output / input
ratio, it is often called productivity, and this is the term that we will use for the
remainder of this chapter when referring to that measure. In this case, the
production of each hospital is defined via the Medicaid reimbursement dollars for
the state of New Jersey, sometimes referred as New Jersey Weights. In other words,
the units produced by a hospital are the number of dollars the hospital would have
been reimbursed if all patients had been Medicaid patients payable via the DRG
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system at New Jersey rates. In this measure high numbers refer to efficient facilities,
as it means that few dollars were spent relative to the dollars that would have been
reimbursed by Medicaid. The ratios were scaled from 0 to 1.. Case-mix adjusted
productivity is a measure of performance widely used in practice. Its main drawback
is that it assumes that there exists a set of weights that allow to compare different
classes of patients. Errors in the computation of these weights greatly diminish the
validity of productivity as a measure of performance. The weights used in this
chapter (the Medicaid New Jersey DRG weights) are not necessarily accepted by the
whole professional community [591], [631. We have selected them because they are
the most used in the literature.
Figure 6-5 presents the histogram of the productivity ratios for the 160
hospitals in the system.
Figure 6-5: Productivity: Histogram of the Productivity scaled from 0.0 to 1.0
Productivity Number of
Hospitals
0.2 1 *
0.3 8 ********
0.4 30 ****************************
0.5 43
0.6 32 ***************************
0.7 19 *****************
0.8 14
0.9 12 ***********
1.0 1 *
Figure 6-6 presents the plot of this productivity ratio versus DEA efficiency.
One should note that DEA efficiency shows little relationship to this traditional
measure of hospital performance.
Figure 6-7 presents the average Productivity measure for the three sets of
I·_ _1_1 I II_ II_
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Figure 6-6: Production/Direct Cost vs. DEA Efficiency
Productivity
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efficient and inefficient hospitals and in the combined score as computed by MOO.
It also shows productivity versus the DEA efficient and inefficient facilities. Note
that all four sets of results have statistically significant differences in the averages
(the parentheses signal the 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean). This
shows that MOO efficiency, at least in this case, is in accordance with this most
classical measure of efficiency. Also note that DEA, when used only to select
efficient facilities does discriminate well between high and low productivity
hospitals. It is when we tried to use the actual value of the inefficiencies that little
relationship is found, as described in figure 6-6.
*
*
*
*i
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Figure 6-7: Analysis of Variance of Productivity by MOO and DEA Efficiency.
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Comparison of computational results obtained with DEA and MOO:
In order to better understand the differences in the efficiency results between the
two procedures (DEA and MOO), the average productivity of different sets of
hospitals were compared using Student's t-test.
First, the two sets of efficient hospitals were compared (See figure 6-8). The
results show that the hypothesis of the average productivity of the two sets being
the same would be rejected with a confidence level of 95%. That is, the average
productivity of the MOO efficient hospitals is significantly higher than that of the
DEA efficient hospitals. Note also that MOO classifies as efficient one third of the
number of hospitals classified as efficient by DEA. In other words, MOO chooses as
efficient a subset of those hospitals chosen as efficient by DEA that has a
statistically significant higher productivity (measured as case-mix adjusted Medicaid
dollars divided by direct cost).
Figure 6-8: t-Test of Average Productivity of the Efficient Hospitals
Standard Standard
Count Mean Deviat. Deviation
Product. Product. of the Mean
MOO 29 0.676 0.160 0.030
DEA 102 0.605 0.158 0.016
95% Confidence Interval of the difference: (0.003, 0.139)
On the other hand, the two sets of hospitals labeled inefficient by the two
algorithms are not statistically different, that is, MOO increases the number of
inefficient hospitals without significantly increasing the average productivity of the
group. (See figure 6-9, the hypothesis of equal means can not be rejected at the 5%
confidence level).
Summarizing, one can say that MOO is more specific than DEA in the sense
that its efficient set is smaller than the DEA efficient set, and the statistical
_1_11____
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Figure 6-9: t-Test of Average Productivity of the Non-Efficient Hospitals
Count Mean St.Dev St.Deviation
Product. Product. of the Mean
MOO 131 0.550 0.152 0.013
DEA 58 0.517 0.150 0.020
95% Confidence Interval of the difference: (-0.014, 0.081)
comparison of the average productivity of the non-efficient hospitals in both
techniques shows no difference at the confidence level of 95%.
The differences between DEA, MOO and productivity do not imply that any
of these measures is incorrect or invalid, but certainly should raise caution toward
employing any single measure of efficiency without careful consideration of the facts
that may influence its result.
6.1.9 Summary and Final Comments
This section has compared two procedures to measure hospital efficiency.
They rely on the assumption that efficiency can be measured either as some linear
combination of hospital inputs and outputs (DEA), or as the relative position of
each facility in the multidimensional space of case-mix discharges (MOO). In both
these two methodologies efficiencies are computed without having to specify the a
priori weights to combine inputs and outputs respectively. We have applied these
methods to a set of 160 hospitals from a non-for-profit chain and we compared the
results to the more traditional efficiency measure of case-mix adjusted productivity.
In our analysis we have found little relation between DEA measured efficiency and
case-mix adjusted productivity. Both DEA and MOO label as efficient sets of
hospitals with significantly higher productivity than those they labeled inefficient.
MOO was more specific than DEA in the sense that its efficient set was smaller than
the DEA efficient set. The average case-mix adjusted productivity of the M1OO-
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efficient set is significantly higher than the average case-mix adjusted productivity
of the DEA-efficient set. The average productivities of both inefficient sets are not
statistically different at the 95% level of confidence.
As final comment, it should be said that the mathematical-programming based
efficiency measures ignore quality issues, and therefore, one could argue that a
facility labeled as inefficient by DEA or MOO can possibly provide much better
care than another considered efficient. Also, the reasons for the inefficiencies are
not straightforwardly derived from the results of the algorithms, and the analyst
should use the results only as a procedure to flag potential problems in the hospital
system. Therefore, they should be seen as valuable tools to complement traditional
analyses rather that replace them.
6.2 A Model for the Relationship Between Residents and Medical
Students and the Production of Health-Care Services.
6.2.1 Introduction
This section describes an attempt to model and quantify the relationships
existing between staff, students (residents, medical and non-medical students) and
the output of health care institutions. The data used to develop and validate the
model come from the hospital chain refered as Y in Chapter 3 (Data Sources).
6.2.2 Description of the model
The philosophy underlying the model is that in teaching hospitals, students
will use some staff full time equivalent (FTE) resources in order to be taught, which
would otherwise be devoted to patient care. In return, students may provide some
patient care service. In other words, the institutional FTE resources used by
students are assumed to be non-productive in the sense of generating patient care
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(weighted workload units or outpatient visits). On the other hand, the presence of
the student in the institution may contribute to the production of some, non-
duplicative, patient care services. If a student required as much institutional FTE
instructional time as the student equivalently provided in the form of patient care,
then the net effect of the student on the institution's productive FTE would be zero.
Some kinds of students may have a high demand on staff FTE and a very low
productive output, medical students, for example. Others, such as residents, may
have a low demand on the institution's FTE and be very productive.
The model does not consider whether a student or staff member is working 40
hours a week or 80. If the pay system registers one full time equivalent then the
employee is credited with 40 hours of paid time. An average productive employee
who works more than 40 hours (but only gets paid one Full Time Equivalent), will
be seen as more productive than his 40 hour a week peers.
For each student type, then, there are at least two numbers which need to be
developed. One number is a measure of the patient care services that a student can
produce during some fixed period of time like a month2 3 . The second number
represents the number of teaching hours required from a teacher per student. This
latter number could be developed for each kind of teacher, including residents and
staff physicians.
The patient care workload output of the institution then can be expressed as
the sum of the workload produced by the staff and workload produced by the
students.
Total Workload = Staff-produced Workload
+ Student-produced Workload.
23The measure used in this section for patient care production is the same that was used in the
efficiency study, namely, New Jersey Weights.
_Ll__lllllil__l___iil________.
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The Staff workload can be estimated by multiplying the available staff time
times the staff productivity coefficient (units of output per FTE of staff time). The
student workload is the sum of the products of student time and student
productivity coefficient. All staff are assumed to be equally productive, and all
students of a similar type are assumed to be equally productive.
There are two workload components used in this model, inpatient Weighted
Workload Units (WWU) and outpatient visits. The in-patient weighted workload
units is the annual weighted sum of all the discharges that the hospital has
produced, where the weights are normalized New Jersey non-Physician Direct
dollars (for unaffiliated hospitals) that correspond to the discharge DRG of each
patient. The workload units include weighting for very long length of stay patients.
The outpatient component of production is measured by total number of annual
visits.
1. TW = PCS*ps + SFTE*pr
Where:
TW - Total Workload, inpatient and outpatient
PCS - Patient care staff in fte
ps - Staff patient care productivity in wwu's/fte
SFTE - Students in fte
pr - Student productivity in wwu's/fte
Also:
2. PCS = TSFTE - TES
Where:
TSFTE - Total Staff Full Time Equivalents
TES - Teaching staff time in fte
PCS - Patient-care staff time in fte
Also, we assume that the time devoted to teaching by the hospital staff will be
proportional to the student body sizes:
3. TES = (SFTE1 * tcl) + (SFTE2 * tc2) + . .
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Where:
TES - Teaching staff time in fte
SFTEn - Number of type n Students in fte
tcn - Teacher to student ratio (unitless) for student type n
Using one type of student, the above simplifies to:
4. TW = ps * TSFTE - tc * SFTE] + pr * SFTE
or
= ps * TSFTE + [pr - ps * tc] * SFTE
In the second equation, the quantity inside the parenthesis is the effect of the
students on the production of the hospital. It consists of two terms, 1 - the positive
(pr) is the student productivity, from which the lost production by the teachers
must be subtracted: namely 2 - the student to teacher ratio (tc) times the teachers
productivity (ps). If the quantity inside of the parenthesis is close to zero, then the
patient care output of the institution can be equated to the staffing load.
6.2.3 The Y data
The Department of Medicine and Surgery of chain Y has various data systems
describing the number of students by the level of the student, and the professional
FTE and workload output for each institution (for this study, the number of
hospitals with reliable data was 158). The department also requires each hospital to
identify the amount of professional staff time which is dedicated to the support of
educational activities. These data can be combined to estimate the teaching time
requirements and the productivity capacity for each class of student. Thus it may
be possible to show the effect of medical students upon teaching requirements of
residents at various levels of training and the teaching requirements of staff
physicians.
The variables and their particular sources used in the analysis that follows are:
Inpatient Workload Prodiuction: Measulred in Weighted Workload Units
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(WWU). This units are computed using data from the Fiscal Year 1983 (FY83)
Patient Discharge Abstract file, which summarizes all the discharges in FY83.
Outpatient Workload Production: Measured as Visit Counts.
Staff FTE: Total direct Physician FTE.
Research FTE: This is a self reported figure, each staff physician states at the
end of each quarter what percentage of its time was devoted to research. This
research time is charged to particular research projects or to a general research
account, and therefore, for this study, research FTE were simply subtracted from
the total available FTE.
Teaching Staff Time: Measured in FTE, extracted from the self-reported
hospitat estimates. Only those reported FTE in Cost Centers directly involved with
patient care were used.
Resident FTE: From the position counts provided by the Office of
Educational Programs in Y headquarters. This is the office which is responsible for
distributing residency positions.
Other Students: From self-reported count from the hospitals. These data are
used in the model to estimate teacher to student ratios for medical students, and do
not effect the estimates of resident productivity or of the resident to staff ratio.
Affiliation Status: There are several classification strategies that can be used
to identify teaching and non-teaching hospitals. Formal medical school affiliation,
number of teaching programs and number of residents can all be used and give
different results. Preliminary analysis of the several different sources of data
describing the affiliation status of the Y hospitals revealed many inconsistencies.
Given these inconsistencies, we decided to classify as affiliated all hospitals that
according to the Office of Educational Programs had more than five residents. All
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other hospitals were considered unaffiliated and their reported counts of teaching
FTE, other students etc., forced to be zero. This produces 41 unaffiliated and 117
affiliated institutions.
6.2.4 Results
Staff Productivity:
Staff productivity was estimated by analyzing the data from the unaffiliated
hospitals, those which we classified as unaffiliated (non-teaching). Linear regression
was used to calculate the estimates. This assumes that the full FTE of the medical
staff in unaffiliated institutions is devoted to patient care, either producing WWUs
(i.e. inpatient care) or OPC visits (outpatient care.) We ignored the administrative
loads on the staff. We argued that the administrative functions of the physician
staff will vary in accordance with the intensity of the care provided.
Analytically,
TSFTE=a, + b * TW + b 2 * OPC
TSFTE and TW as described above.
OPC - Total outpatient visit count.
b1 - Inverse of the staff inpatient WWU productivity
b2 - Inverse of the staff Outpatient visits productivity
The resulting regression equation is (41 Stations used):
Staff.FTE = -3.44 + 0.000061 * TW + 0.000214 * OPC.vis
The R 2 was 86.2'%, and the analysis of the variance showed that the intercept
(-3.44) is statistically non-distinguishable from zero, (t-ratio=-2.0).
This result is equivalent to saying that in the average, a physician annually
produces either 16,400 weighted-workload units or 4673 Outpatient Visits, or a
linear combination between the two.
--I
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Student Productivity.
In order to estimate the productivity of the students, we use the following
strategy: First, we computed the total FTE that would be necessary in order to
produce the observed WWU in the affiliated hospitals assuming that productivity of
staff physicians is constant through the system. In order words, we computed the
"theoretical FTE" of the affiliated institutions as if the affiliated hospitals had no
students, and all the time of the staff were dedicated to patient care as it is in the
unaffiliated hospitals. Second, we subtract from this theoretical FTE the actual
patient care FTE of the staff. This difference, must be the "staff equivalent" of the
students, that is, the number of staff physicians that would have had to be in the
hospital in order to produce what have produced the residents and medical students.
This "staff-equivalent" has to be explained by the different counts of students in the
system.
Figure 6-10: Staff Equivalent Histogram for Affiliated Institution
Middle of Number of
Interval Observations
-10 3 ***
0 6 ******
10 24 ************************
20 19 *******************
30 18 ******************
40 10 **********
50 10 **********
60 4 ****
70 2 **
80 3 ***
90 2 **
A histogram of the "staff equivalent" of the students is presented in 6-10.
Note that three institutions have negative equivalents, that implies that in those
hospitals, the staff alone produces more WNVU and OPC visits per FTE than the
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average unaffiliated institutions. To evaluate which data set could better explain
the "staff equivalent", the following stepwise regression was run:
'Staff.EQU' vs 'Rsfte.aa' 'pd_res' 'woe_res' 'meds34' 'medsl2' 'nonmds'
Staff.EQU - "Staff equivalent" in FTE as defined above.
Rsfte.aa - Residents FTE. Data from Educational Office.
pd_res - Number of paid residents.
woc res - Number of non-paid residents.
medsl2 - Number of first and second year med students.
meds34 - Number of third and fourth year med students.
nonmds - Number of non physician students
(technicians, nurses and social workers)
The only explanatory variable that entered the model with any significant
explanatory power was Rsfte.aa, the FTE count from the Educational Office.
Therefore, the following regression model was fit:
Staff.EQU = a + pres * Rsfte.aa
pres - FTE equivalent of the residents. Unitless.
The result was:
Staff.EQU = 1.89 + 0.338 Rsfte.aa
Again, the intercept has no statistical significance (t-ratio = 0.61), and
R 2 -48%. Note that even that the fit is not very good (we can only explain half of
the variance observed in the "Staff equivalents"), the coefficient (.338) estimates
that, on the average, for all teaching institutions, it takes three residents in order to
produce the same as a staff physician (when production is measured as case-mix
adjusted WWU and outpatient visits.)
Student teaching requirement from the faculty.
The amount of time required by the students in order to be taught, was
estimated from the student counts and the estimates of the teaching load provided
by the institutions in the self-reported part of the general ledger.
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Of the various counts of students available, we decided to use the resident
count from Corporate Headquarters and the medical and non-medical student
counts from the self-reported data. A stepwise regression showed that the medical
and non-medical student counts had no relationship with the teaching FTE reported
by the hospitals. In consequence, the following model was used:
Staff.teaching.FTE = rt * Rsfte.aa
rt - resident teaching requirement from the staff. Unitless.
The result was:
teach.fte = -0.54 + 0.253 Rsfte.aa
The constant term was not significantly different from zero (t-ratio=-0.89), and
R 2 =82.0%.
6.2.5 Evaluation of the Model.
In order to have some estimate of the goodness of the prediction of the overall
model, we used the observed values of staff FTE, teaching load, residents, OPC
visits, etc. to compute the expected hospital production. The relative workload
unit differences ([expected - observed]/observed), are displayed in figure 6-11. A
positive relative error indicates that a facility is relatively unproductive with regard
to the model assumptions. Except for a positive outlier in the Non-Teaching
institutions, the Relative errors are unbiased, and reflect a reasonably good fit of
the model. Also, errors coming from teaching and non-teaching institutions can not
be statistically differentiated.
Another measure of the goodness of the model comes from regressing the
predicted versus the observed WWU. The result of such regression is:
Estimated WWU -= 50262 + 0.902 Observed WWU
The constant term has t-ratio = 1.51, that is, it can not be statistically
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Figure 6-11: Relative Prediction Errors by the Model.
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differentiated from zero, and R 2=63.3%.
A table with detailed results and data for each hospital is presented in
appendix C.
6.2.6 Conclusions.
An additional method for evaluating the model described in the previous
section could be done by using data for another year, from the Y chain, or to use
the same kind of data from a different set of hospitals, (like a for profit chain, etc.)
_ I 
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Further, it could be possible to design a set of engineering studies which would
sample productivity and teaching time from Y hospitals. These data could be used
to validate the coefficients calculated here. Without testing the model with different
data or with different estimating techniques, we have to limit our conclusions to the
Y case, and further yet, to the Fiscal Year 1983.
The results of this study can be summarized as follows:
Staff productivity: One Full Time Equivalent of staff physician produces (in
the average, in the non-affiliated Y hospitals for FY83) either 16,400 Case-Mix
Adjusted Weighted Workload Units or 4673 Outpatient Visits, or a linear
combination between the two.
Resident productivity: Assuming that staff physicians of affiliated and non-
affiliated hospitals have the same patient care productivity during the time they do
not devote to research or teaching, one Full Time Equivalent of Resident, as
counted by the Office of Educational Programs, has one third of the productivity of
a Full Time Equivalent of a Staff Physician.
Teaching load: The teaching load that the residents impose on the teaching
staff is 0.25 staff FTE for resident FTE. In other words, for each four residents in a
Y hospital, there is a loss of one staff FTE from pure production. The medical
students have no statistical relationship with the teaching load. This may be due to
the fact that staff do medical student teaching during rounds, when they also teach
residents, and the real one-to-one teaching of medical students is generally done by
residents and interns themselves. The teaching load of the non-medical students
(nurses, social workers, etc.) on the staff is also non-statistically significant.
Concluding, we can say that in the teaching hospitals, the net productivity of
a resident is 1/12 of that of a staff physician. This comes from subtracting 1/4
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from a teacher's production but producing 1/3, net production of 1/12 per FTEE.
Note that if the hospital where paying residents 1/12 the salary of the staff
members, it would have (as it regards to salary) a teaching program at no cost in
terms of personnel. Issues regarding costs incurred in other areas (such as length of
stay and ancillary use) are nod addressed here.
6.3 Budgeting the Hospital Chain Y. Numerical Example
Chapter 5 applied the Minimum-Risk and Equal-Probability algorithms to the
different clinical services of hospital X. Now, the scope will be moved to multi-
institutional budgeting, and in this section, the budgeting units will be the 160
hospitals of chain Y.
The first step in the allocation process is to compute the Probability
Distribution Function of the total Direct Patient-Care dollars spent during the
previous budgeting period by each hospital. As detailed in chapter 4, chain Y does
not keep patient-specific cost data, and therefore it is not possible to compute total
cost PDFs in the same manner that was done in hospital X: via the costing of all
tests and procedures that each patient had. To circumvent this problem, we used
as the cost of each admission the same proxy introduced in section 4.3: the case-mix
adjusted length of stay2 4 .
With the cost of each patient on hand, the expected value and the variance of
the cost of an admission in each of the 470 DRGs can be estimated. Assuming that
the case mix seen by each hospital will not change, we are able to estimate (1) the
expected total cost for each hospital, and (2) its variance.
24 Recall that the case mix adjusted length or stay relies on the assumption that for each DRG the
cost of a particular admission is proportional to the length of stay.
_ ___m______1_11_____ls_
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For each hospital, the expected total cost is the sum of the total costs of
treating the patients in each DRG. If the hospital had grounds to expect changes in
its case mix, the expected value of the total cost would not be the same as in the
previous budgeting period; instead, the correct expected total cost would be
computed using the average cost in each DRG and the forecasted case mix. The
variance of the total cost of each hospital is the sum of the variances within each
DRG weighted by the expected case mix.
For each of the 160 hospitals, the average and the standard deviation define
the PDFs of the total cost, and therefore their budgets can be computed using the
two algorithms described in chapter 4. The detailed results of the two allocation
runs (under the assumption of a 10% increase on the expected total budget) are
presented in Appendix D.
A summary of the budget changes that occur when switching from a fixed
percentage increase of 10% to the two variance-based algorithms is presented by the
histograms in figures 6-12 and 6-13.
Figure 6-12 presents a histogram of the changes in total budget that are
observed when moving from Proportional Allocation to the Minimum Risk strategy.
The height of each bar is the number of hospitals that would have the budget
change indicated in the X axis. Negative numbers imply that the proportionally
allocated budget is larger than the minimum risk budget. The percentage of
increase over the previous year budget that the total Minimum Risk methodology
allocates to each hospital is presented in the bottom histogram of figure 6-12. Note
that the same histogram for the Fixed Percentage method would show all hospitals
at the 0.1 mark.
As seen in the numerical example of chapter 5., the allocated resources vary
considerably for some budgeting units; budgeting units with large variance get
_
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larger amounts of money to offset their inherent risk. Again, if the total budget had
to be reduced, institutions with large variance would have their budget reduced the
most.
Using the methodology of Equal Probability rather than the methodology of
Minimum Risk produces similar allocated budgets. The differences, in thousands of
dollars, are presented in figure 6-13. These differences in budget between the two
strategies, even though they are smaller than between these variance-based
strategies and Proportional Allocation, can be as high as $0.9 million.
The hospitals that get more resources with the Equal Probability methodology
are those that have high variance but small expected budgets (high coefficients of
variation with small total budget). The explanation is that their high variance
implies that they will need extra dollars with high probability, but their small
volume does not make them big contributors to the total risk.
68.3.1 Using Efficiency Measures.
As described in the theoretical development of chapter 3, one can use the
variance-based allocation methodologies in combination with efficiency measures of
the budgeting units. In order to do this, one is bound to use the DEA methodology
described in the previous sections, as it is necessary to have a quantitative measure
of the relative efficiency of all facilities, a measure that is not given by the MOO
technique.
Since MOO performed better as a methodology in our example, the following
two-step strategy is proposed to incorporate MOO efficiency into the allocation
process:
1. Allocate only a percentage of the available funds. The remaining
resources will be used for rewarding efficient facilities. Corporate
managers have to decide what an appropriate "tax" would be, maybe 5
_ 111 ___
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to 10%o.
2. Allocate this leftover money to the efficient facilities.
This procedure has two very important properties: (1) It removes more dollars
from facilities with high variance, and (2) It rewards efficient hospitals. Because of
these features, this allocation methodology will introduce incentives toward (1)
having a narrow distribution of expected costs and therefore striving toward a
standardization of care, and (2) becoming MOO efficient.
The last two columns of the table in Appendix D and figure 6-14 show the
results of using the Minimum Risk algorithm to allocate a 5% increase in total
budget to all facilities (analogously to the allocation described in the previous
paragraphs) and another 5 to the MOO efficient facilities only. The total dollars
allocated are the same as those in figure 6-12.
In the first histogram of figure 6-14, each bar is the count of hospitals the had
the shift of dollars from a proportional allocation to the efficiency-adjusted
allocation expressed by the corresponding X value. Comparing this histogram with
that of figure 6-12, one sees that the efficiency-adjusted allocation does penalize
more facilities (by budgeting them less resources than the proportional allocation)
than the non-adjusted methodology. This effect comes from the fact that only half
the initial amount of dollars is available to be allocated to every facility, and that
only efficient facilities benefit from the other half.
6.3.2 Conclusion
To conclude the discussion on variance-based resource allocation
methodologies for systems of hospitals, the following points should be highlighted:
*Variance-based resource allocation produces budgets that are different
from those arrived at by proportionally deviating from the expected
values. These differences may be large for sets of hospitals with widely
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Figure 6-14: Budget Changes from 10% Proportional Increase to
MOO Efficiency-Adjusted Minimum Total Risk
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different coefficients of variation.
* The inherent randomness of the patient-care process must be taken into
account when deviating from the expected value of expenses, especially
in the absence of control over volume or if volume changes are
undesirable.
* Reducing budgets without taking into account the variance of resource
usage puts institutions with small coefficients of variation in a situation
of very high risk.
* The variability of resource usage on which to base resource allocation
should be the variance unexplained by a patient-classification technique,
and not a reflection of the inability to classify patients into homogeneous
classes 25.
25The DRG system alone may not be sufficient to pass judgment on the inherent variability of
resource usage in the patient-care process; chapter 4 of this thesis shows that the Severity of Illness
Index and Disease Staging reduce by more than 80% the variance unexplained by DRGs in a
teaching hospital. In the numerical example of this section we have used DRGs alone because neither
of the two subclassifications were available for all 160 hospitals. If a variance-based methodology
had to be implemented for routine resource allocation, it would be necessary to use one of the
subclassifications in order to differentiate different levels of patient severity.
115-
Chapter 7
Summary and Topics for Future Research
7.1 Summary
This research has dealt with the issue of resource allocation in health care
institutions. The thesis revolves around the randomness of the resources needed for
the health-care delivery process and how knowledge about such randomness can be
used to allocate resources fairly and to introduce incentives for cost containment.
The most important sources of this randomness are (1) case-mix variations
from one year to the next and (2) the inherent variability of the resources needed to
treat seemingly similar patients. This randomness differentiates resource allocation
in the health care industry from many other industries.
This inherent variability in resource usage must be differentiated from another
source of variability in resource usage: patients that are considered as belonging to
the same category may in fact be different. In order to discriminate between these
sources of randomness, one has to be able to discriminate between different classes
of patients. Part of this research was devoted to analyzing various methodologies for
patient classification. The Severity of Illness Index (SII) and Disease Staging (DS)
were compared for their ability to reduce the observed variance in resource usage.
The evaluation was carried out using cost (rather than charges) data from a
large teaching hospital. The results indicate that both methodologies effectively
reduce the variance of the observed resource usage within DRGs. SII is somewhat
better as variance reducer but has the drawback of being a more subjective
measure, which cannot be automatically assigned to patients from the Uniform
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Discharge Summaries by a computer program.
The analysis also concluded that around 20 properly chosen DRGs subdivided
by either SII or DS were enough to obtain more than 85% of the possible Reduction
in Variance that can be attained using all 470 DRGs.
This thesis advocates using clinical services as budgeting units, i.e., resources
are allocated by management to Clinical Services (for example Surgery), which
"purchase" services from the Support Services (for example Radiology.)
This approach is in accordance with a framework that views hospital activity
as a two-stage production process. In the first stage, resources are converted into
"intermediate products," the individual procedures and services provided in the
patient-care areas, such as laboratory tests and nursing-care hours. In the second
stage, the intermediate products are grouped in the clinical services and under the
supervision of physicians to form "cases." Cases are the "finished products" by
which the hospital is reimbursed under the prospective DRG-based reimbursement
system.
The generic model for resource allocation that this thesis proposed is based on
the maximization of the utility function of the decision maker. When the utility
function takes very simple and intuitive forms, the resource allocation problem is
transformed into a Minimum Risk and a Mini-Max problem. These mathematical
problems can be solved with existing optimization algorithms.
The proposed resource allocation methodologies are used to compute the
budgets for (1) the different Clinical Services of the Division of Medicine of a
teaching hospital and (2) 160 hospitals of a chain. The results in both cases highlight
the fact that budgets do change considerably when variance-based criteria are used.
This research shows that when managers must deviate from the expected
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value of the expenses, as is the case when reducing budgets, they should take into
account the inherent variability of the health-care process. In the absence of control
over volume, budgeting units with narrow distributions of expected costs are much
more vulnerable to budget cutting than units with high variance, as the latter still
have a fairly reasonable probability of not needing the resources that were removed.
As accessories to resource allocation at the multi-institutional level, two
different measures of hospital efficiency were described and evaluated in this thesis:
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Multiple Objective Optimization (MOO).
Also, a quantitative approach for the evaluation of the relationships between
personnel and productivity in teaching hospitals was developed and applied to data
from a chain of 160 hospitals.
The efficiency study showed that there is little relation between DEA
measured efficiency and case-mix adjusted productivity. Both DEA and MOO label
as efficient a set of hospitals with significantly higher productivity that those labeled
inefficient. Comparing the productivity of the hospitals called efficient by DEA with
the productivity of the hospitals called efficient by MOO, it was observed that
MOO was more specific than DEA in the sense that its efficient set was smaller than
the DEA set, and the average case-mix adjusted productivity of the MOO-efficient
set was significantly higher than that of the DEA-efficient set, while the average
productivity of both inefficient sets were not statistically different.
This thesis also examines the relationship between teaching loads and
productivity. The model developed reveals that (under the assumptions detailed in
chapter 6) the case-mix adjusted productivity of a resident is, on the average, one
third of that of a staff physician. Also, since teachers have one fourth less
productivity for each full-time resident present in the hospital, the net productivity
of a resident is 1/3 minus 1/4, which is 1/12. Even though this model is imperfect
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and only explains about 60% of the variance in productivity that is observed
between teaching and non-teaching hospitals, it highlights the fact that quantitative
approaches to physician staffing problems are indeed feasible.
7.1.1 Budgeting for Research and Capital Expenditures
Because the focus of this thesis has been on patient-care operational budgets
rather than on global budgets for the whole institution, the topic of research
budgeting has not been studied with the depth it deserves, and a few comments are
appropriate here.
Currently, research involving patients is funded from two sources: drugs and
data analysis are paid by research grants, and patient-care costs are paid by the
patient or the insurer. These "extra" costs are not small; Yarbro and Mortenson
[671 state that in a hospital in New Jersey, under the DRG system, 21 patients in
clinical trials represented loses to the hospital of an average of $1,057 per admission,
while patients in the same DRG not on the trial carried an average loss of $35 per
admission. Not surprisingly, [671 advocated for the creation by Medicare of DRG
471 "NIH-approved clinical trials."
Research performed in hospitals should be funded from sources other than
patient-care monies. Even if ultimately the hospital increases its charges to non-
prospective payers willing to pay full bills, internal accounting and budgeting should
reflect which expenditures are for patient-care purposes and which are for research
purposes.
If a clinical department is running an experiment evaluating the effect of some
new therapy and has to order tests that would otherwise not be required for routine
care of the same patients, the costs of performing such tests should be charged to
the research project. Medicare, as other insurance carriers, is not intended to
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support clinical research as part of its current mandate [47]. The statutory
restrictions of Medicare force the program to pay for the "efficient provision of
needed health services to beneficiaries," it covers "established and accepted
procedures," of which clinical research is not2 6 .
Capital-Expenditure budgeting and the budgeting of new programs have not
been addressed in this research. For these one-time expenditures, zero-based
budgeting mechanism is appropriate. Such methodology requires that the units
needing the resources present to the upper management a plan for implementing the
new program and proof of its cost effectiveness in the long run.
7.2 Topics for Future Research
Case-Mix Forecasting: Part of this thesis has dealt with the problem of
reducing the observed variance of the resources used by the patient population. This
has been done by defining classes of patients as uniformly as possible.
For budgeting purposes, we have to be concerned not only with having
defined uniform classes of patients but also with being able to predict how many
patients the hospital is going to see in each of the possible classes. In other words, a
second component of the variance of the expected total cost of operation is how well
the case mix can be forecasted.
Dividing the patient population in a very large number of classes would
greatly reduce the variance, since it would be possible to put in the same class only
those patients that had very close characteristics. Even though it would ensure a
2 6 Even with this prohibition of funding clinical research, we can add as an anecdote that Medicaid
paid all but costs of 5 days of care of the 114 days (a $254,068 bill) for Barney Clark's artificial
heart insertion in 1982 [21]. Now, under the DRG system, there is no automatic reimbursement for
heart transplantation, be it human or artificial.
11
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high R1V for the observed costs, this would do little to help with the prediction error
of the expected total costs, as the forecasting problem increases in difficulty as the
number of classes increases.
Future research has to analyze the stability of workload forecasting, both as a
function of volume and as a function of case mix, and the effect of forecasting errors
on the allocation process.
Medical School Affiliation: This thesis has presented a simple model for
the study of the effect of residents and medical students on medical staff
requirements. The data, even though not fully reliable, shows that such approaches
are feasible and produce results consistent with the perceptions of clinicians and
hospital administrators.
Future research should expand the model introduced here to include objective
measurements of teaching time by staff physicians, and differentiation between
specialty and general-medicine residents, as well as different degrees of medical
school affiliation.
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Appendix A
Efficiencies Using DEA and MOO
Column Definitions
DEA Effic.: Efficiency Computed using Data Envelopment Analysis.
MOO Effic. FTE : Efficiency According to Mult. Objective Optimization,
Measure is Discharges/Full Time Equivalents.
MOO Effic. S.$ : Efficiency According to Mult. Objective Optimization,
Measure is Discharges/Direct Salary Costs.
MOO Effic. O.$ : Efficiency According to Mult. Objective Optimization,
Measure is Discharges/Other Direct Costs.
MOO Effic. Comb: Efficiency According to Mult. Objective Optimization,
Efficient only if efficient in three previous tests.
Productivity : Medicaid Reimbursement Dollars/Total Direct Costs,
scaled from 0 to 1.
Hospital
Code
402
405
436
437
438
442
452
455
460
500
501
502
503
DEA
Effic
0.615
0.382
0.647
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.491
0.533
1.000
1.000
MOO
Effic
(FTE)
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
MOO MOO MOO Productivity
Effic. Effic. Effic.
(S.$)
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1O
1
(0.$)
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
(Comb)
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.58428
0.47643
0.78979
0.57057
0.57197
0.81916
0.53546
0.51237
0.56724
0.52718
0.42407
0.79418
0.71040
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504 1.000 i 1 1 1 0.58156
505 0.616 0 0 1 0 0.39042
506 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.28223
508 0.798 0 0 0 0 0.47200
509 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.43918
512 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.45641
513 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.87011
514 0.819 1 1 1 1 0.90086
515 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.53422
516 0.798 1 1 1 1 0.52712
517 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.73993
518 0.298 0 0 0 0 0.32363
519 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.59582
520 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.77925
521 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.45257
522 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.85298
523 0.671 1 1 0 0 0.63232
525 0.559 0 0 0 0 0.84249
526 0.328 0 0 0 0 0.37379
527 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.49868
528 0.532 0 0 0 0 0.58669
529 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.72016
531 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.41620
532 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.60103
533 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.74774
534 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.40479
535 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.53309
537 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.53781
538 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.69025
539 0.734 1 1 0 0 0.40210
540 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.80530
541 0.346 0 0 0 0 0.34259
542 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.44320
543 0.809 1 1 0 0 0.52458
544 0.854 1 1 0 0 0.59604
546 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.42943
549 0.750 1 0 0 0 0.49726
550 1.000 0 0 1 0 0.63007
552 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.62279
553 0.609 0 0 0 0 0.46502
554 0.820 0 0 0 0 0.34853
555 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.48565
556 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.44501
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557 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.69999
558 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.41664
561 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.49646
562 0.577 0 0 0 0 0.70585
564 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.77230
565 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.91073
566 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.79404
567 0.231 0 0 0 0 0.86357
568 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.51534
569 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.79625
570 0.560 0 0 0 0 0.37133
573 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.42336
574 1.000 0 0 1 0 0.76840
575 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.62821
578 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.59715
579 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.65441
580 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.62900
581 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.63177
583 0.637 0 0 0 0 0.44819
584 0.497 0 0 0 0 0.35044
585 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.65735
586 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.54727
589 0.456 0 0 0 0 0.38418
590 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.38457
591 1.000 0 1 1 0 0.91599
592 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.72990
594 1.000 1 1 1 1 1.00000
595 0.632 0 0 0 0 0.71053
596 0.699 1 1 0 0 0.43375
597 0.628 0 0 0 0 0.60846
598 0.411 0 0 0 0 0.47143
599 0.334 0 0 0 0 0.49345
600 0.467 0 0 0 0 0.47531
603 0.715 1 1 0 0 0.49555
604 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.55977
605 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.61597
607 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.43208
608 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.70210
609 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.70578
610 0.422 0 0 0 0 0.71925
611 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.87643
612 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.46066
613 1.000 0 1 0 0 0.91139
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614 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.85588
617 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.78722
618 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.53512
619 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.69858
620 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.85813
621 0.694 1 1 0 0 0.55334
622 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.30850
623 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.52661
626 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.55104
627 0.837 1 1 0 0 0.41943
629 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.45974
630 0.510 0 0 0 0 0.54847
631 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.66086
632 0.719 1 1 0 0 0.33922
635 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.44039
636 0.756 0 0 0 0 0.53830
637 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.82445
640 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.37321
641 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.51942
642 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.45929
644 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.55944
645 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.70024
646 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.54321
647 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.91498
648 0.588 1 0 0 0 0.48119
649 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.57999
650 0.723 1 1 1 1 0.47012
652 0.196 0 0 0 0 0.37923
653 1.000 0 0 1 0 0.63510
654 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.36783
655 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.73158
656 0.741 0 1 0 0 0.55112
657 0.359 0 0 0 0 0.50301
658 0.502 0 0 0 0 0.34731
659 0.851 1 1 1 1 0.85534
660 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.39520
662 0.709 0 0 0 0 0.24181
663 0.660 0 1 0 0 0.41102
664 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.43738
665 1.000 0 0 0 0 0.39188
666 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.47252
667 0.748 0 0 0 0 0.60836
668 1.000 1 1 0 0 0.71699
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1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 O O 0
0 0 0 0
0. 0 0 0
0 O O 0
0 O O 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
O O O0
0 0 0 0
670
671
673
674
676
677
678
679
680
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
693
695
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.754
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.433
1.000
1.000
0.631
1.000
0.655
1.000
0.657
0.419
0.567
0.526
0.50964
0.52136
0.47974
0.60788
0.56245
0.59871
0.40194
0.53873
0.77711
0.59381
0.54632
0.56810
0.55614
0.49745
0.40100
0.30860
0.75663
0.45400
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Appendix B
Pairs Efficient-Non Efficient
Column Definitions
Hospital Identification Code.
DEA efficiency.
Case-Mix Distance to closest efficient hospital.
Proportion of patients in.each Major Diagnosis Category.
Total number of patients discharged in Medical Service.
Total number of direct patient-care Full Time Equivalents.
Total direct patient-care salary dollars.
Total direct patient-care non-salary dollars.
Ind Ef. Dist. Case Mix No.Pat. No.FTE D.SaI.D. D.Oth.D
.... ............................................................................. oo oooo. .-. .. ............
402 0.815 0.087 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 478
537 1.000 0.000 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.08 913
406 0.382 0.078 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.09 210
537 1.000 0.000 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.08 913
436 0.847 0.049 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.33 386
442 1.000 0.000 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.29 541
500 0.491 0.054 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.29 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 800
586 1.000 0.000 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.24 0.27 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 1501
501 0.533 0.088 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.16 0.29 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 544
578 1.000 0.000 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.30 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 740
505 0.818 0.090 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.25 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.10 336
533 1.000 0.000 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.08 362
508 0.798 0.052 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.18 0.33 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 1010
814 1.000 0.000 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.32 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 1550
514 0.819 0.069 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.17 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.30 454
557 1.000 0.000 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.18 0.21 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.33 800
140.4 4.0 1.3
322.3
122.2
322.3
106.1
83.8
278.2
269.1
235.8
714.8
9.5 2.3
3.3 1.5
9.5 2.3
3.0 0.7
2.3 0.5
7.4 2.0
7.0 2.4
6.8 1.8
20.8 2.9
149.6 3.9
140.9 3.5
268.2 7.4
339.3 8.4
0.7
0.7
2.6
0.8
123.3 3.3 0.4
156.2 4.5 0.9
Ind:
Eff.:
Dist.:
Case Mix
No.Pat.:
No.FTE:
D.Sal.D:
D.Oth.D:
_ II_ _ ___i__ _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----
i __I_-_1-1I_
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516 0.798 0.047
452 1.000 0.000
.............. o
518 0.298 0.060
538 1.000 0.000
523 0.871 0.081
527 1.000 0.000
525 0.559 0.090
620 1.000 0.000
2.8
0.9
0.11 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.10 1889
0.13 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.12 546
388.2 10.5
105.2 2.9
0.05 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.23 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.17
0.01 0.08 0.02 0.19 0.23 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.0 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16
173 112.0
578 188.5
3.2 0.7
4.6 0.7
9.6 2.8
15.5 4.7
6.7 1.1
4.5 0.8
0.05 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.0 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.10 1072
0.02 0.03 0.02 0.20 0.24 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.09 1365
352.5
517.5
0.03 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.11
0.00 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.11
475 2B7.2
153 169.9
526 0.328 0.053 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.30 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.07
578 1.000 0.000 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.30 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
528 0.532 0.060 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.18 0.28 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05
665 1.000 0.000 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.20 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05
676 476.1 13.3
740 714.6 20.6
921 433.7 11.8
569 358.8 10.0
2.4
2.9
3.0
2.1
.......... .o...
539 0.734 0.044 0.07 0.04
586 1.000 0.000 0.04 0.04
..... .... ...
0.01 0.24 0.28 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 e86
0.02 0.24 0.27 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 1501
186.3
289.1
5.5 2.0
7.0 2.4
12.5 3.8
7.7 2.6
541 0.346 0.053 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.23 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08
646 1.000 0.000 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.21 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05
688 432.5
744 271.3
0.10 0.06
0.05 0.03
0.05 0.07
0.06 0.06
0.03 0.0
0.02 0.04
0.06 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.31 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0
0.03 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.30 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
0.04 0.02 0.01 0.28 0.28 0.0 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.04
0.03 0.04 0.01 0.26 0.26 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.07
0.04 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.28 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04
0.04 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.28 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07
543 0.809 0.089
506 1.000 0.000
........... 
544 0.854 0.071
504 1.000 0.000
549 0.750 0.054
580 1.000 0.000
553 0.609 0.062
578 1.000 0.000
554 0.820 0.082
521 1.000 0.000
562 0.577 0.081
540 1.000 0.000
587 0.231 0.116
0.01 0.18 0.28 0.10 0.02 0.0 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.02
0.04 0.20 0.29 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03
0.03 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03 o0.17 0.02 0.05
0.03 0.16 0.20 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.08
846 188.0
797 277.7
875 262.9
516 73.5
5.0 2.3
7.8 2.2
7.0 2.4
2.1 0.7
10.9 2.3
14.7 3.1
6.9 1.4
20.6 2.9
5.3 1.8
7.4 2.7
3.2 0.9
3.0 0.8
0.01 0.23 0.28 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 1202
0.01 0.24 0.27 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 1354
383.0
534.2
699 229.5
740 714.6
592 178.7
731 286.3
368 116.8
732 109.2
0.02 0.10 0.01 0.17 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.0l 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.23 81 138.3 1.2 0.4
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442 .000 0.000 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.29 541 83.8 2.3 0.5
570 0.500 0.073
531 1.000 0.000
,..... .... .
583 0.637 0.043
586 1.000 0.000
...............
584 0.497 0.055
555 1.000 0.000
...............
589 0.466 0.061
029 1.000 0.000
...... .. o...o *o
595 0.632 0.054
65 1.000 0.000
59 0.099 0.076
814 1.000 0.000
597 0.828 0.071
438 1.000 0.000
598 0.411 0.050
614 1.000 0.000
599 0.334 0.049
565 1.000 0.000
800 0.487 0.068
685 1.000 0.000
0.03 0.10 0.02 0.24 0.24 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
0.04 0.08 0.02 0.22 0.28 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08
488 173.4
541 101.8
5.2 1.3
2.8 0.9
8.1 2.7
7.0 2.4
5.3 2.6
4.8 1.2
7.0 2.4
8.5 2.4
3.3 0.6
3.8 1.0
7.0 2.9
8.4 0.8
2.0 0.e
3.1 1.2
0.03 0.04 0.01 0.24 0.27 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.0I 0.03 0.01 0.05 90
0.04 0.04 0.02 0.24 0.27 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 1501
298.7
269.1
0.05 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0
0.03 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.27 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.05
524 195.9
893 180.0
0.0 0.0 0.05 0.19 0.27 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 514
0.04 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.28 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 870
246.5
303.4
0.0 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.26 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07
0.03 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.26 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08
286 123.7
755 138.4
0.04 0.0 0.02 0.21 0.30 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.03 876 255.0
0.03 0.0 0.01 0.20 0.32 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 1550 339.3
0.07 0.08 0.02 0.26 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.0I 0.01 0.07
0.04 0.10 0.03 0.21 0.22 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07
264 78.3
504 125.3
0.0 0.06 0.02 0.18 0.32 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 777
0.03 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.32 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.0 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 1550
410.2 11.4
339.3 8.4
3.9
0.8
0.02 0.08 0.03 0.21 0.25 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.0 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08
0.03 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.25 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08
306 165.1
755 138.4
4.8 1.1
3.8 1.0
22.4 4.3
10.0 2.1
0.03 0.07 0.01 0.1§ 0.29 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 1352 746.7
0.04 0.07 0.01 0.20 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 569 358.8
603 0.715 0.052
665 1.000 0.000
610 0.422 0.074
579 1.000 0.000
0.04 0.04 0.02 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.0 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.06
0.04 0.07 0.01 0.20 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05
0.05 0.08 0.02 .11 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.38
0.04 0.05 003 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.39
724 209.6 5.8
589 358.8 10.0
2151 161.9 3.7
635 122.4 3.3
1.7
2.1
0.5
0.5
621 0.694 0.063
623 1.000 0.000
627 0.837 0.069
537 1.000 0.000
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
0.07 0.08 0.03 0.21 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13
0.04 0.10 0.01 0.22 0.20 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.13
0.07 0.07 0.02 0.20 0.19 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.10
0.05 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.03 .03 0.01 0.08
897 209.1
527 137.2
441 100.2
913 322.3
5.6 2.3
3.8 0.8
2.7 1.1
9.5 2.3
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630 0.510 0.058
578 1.000 0.000
632 0.719 0.084
614 1.000 0.000
638 0.758 0.049
818 1.000 0.000
848 0.588 0.064
531 1.000 0.000
650 0.723 0.119
607 1.000 0.000
852 0.198 0.088
509 1.000 0.000
858 0.741 0.089
442 1.000 0.000
8657 0.359 0.059
802 1.000 0.000
858 0.502 0.069
540 1.000 0.000
659 0.851 0.102
823 1.000 0.000
8862 0.709 0.097
508 1.000 0.000
883 0.660 0.085
508 1.000 0.000
887 0.748 0.044
565 1.000 0.000
874 0.754 0.049
823 1.000 0.000
679 0.433 0.071
619 1.000 0.000
0.04 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.31 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
0.03 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.30 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
959 498.9 14.5
740 714.8 20.0
0.03 0.10 0.02 0.18 0.31 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.02 899 287.9
0.03 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.32 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 1550 339.3
0.0 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.25 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 8866 230.2
0.05 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.08 1800 396.1
0.04 0.07 0.02 0.19 0.24 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.10 1528
0.04 0.08 0.02 0.22 0.28 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08 541
0.14 0.03 0.01 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.08
0.05 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.05
0.08 0.03 0.01 0.18 0.34 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05
0.05 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.28
0.04 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.29
478.6
101.8
780 221.0
850 239.9
338 430.7
747 272.0
187 80.1
541 83.8
0.08 0.04 0.05 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.05 955 521.1
0.05 0.03 0.02 0.23 0.22 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.04 1219 255.6
0.08 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05
0.04 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.28 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07
0.11 0.09 0.02 0.25 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07
0.04 0.10 0.01 0.22 0.20 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.13
0.12 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.29 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
0.05 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.29 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03
0.08 0.03 0.02 0.17 0.30 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02
0.05 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.29 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03
0.05 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.20 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.10
0.03 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.25 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08
545 201.4
732 109.2
485 128.7
527 137.2
742 222.2
797 277.7
670 218.4
707 277.7
993 244.2
755 138.4
0.04 0.08 0.03 0.21 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.12 1508 341.9
0.04 0.10 0.01 0.22 0.20 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.13 527 137.2
0.02 0.10 0.01 0.23 0.18 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.18 183 79.4
0.02 0.07 0.03 0.27 0.18 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.18 450 110.2
7.4 1.8
8.4 0.8
8.2 1.8
11.4 2.2
13.6 3.8
2.8 0.9
8.4 1.8
8.1 1.8
11.3 3.0
7.7 2.0
1.4 0.2
2.3 0.5
15.2 3.4
7.0 2.9
5.8 1.2
3.0 0.8
3.4 0.8
3.8 0.8
6.9 2.4
7.8 2.2
5.4 1.9
7.8 2.2
6.3 1.8
3.8 1.0
9.4 2.3
3.8 0.8
1.' 0.3
2.9 0.8
3.4
2.9
_I_ __
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686 0.831 0.079 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.14 856 198.7 5.5 1.0
581 1,.000 0.000 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.15 1071 538.9 10.5 3.6
888 0.655 0.043 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.31 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 915 395.1 12.0 2.5
578 1.000 0.000 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.30 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 740 714.8 20.6 2.9
890 0.857 0.172 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.52 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 252 108.0 3.0 0.8
534 1.000 0.000 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.17 0.38 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 438 183.8 4.8 1.6
891 0.419 0.064 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.18 0.27 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.09 1248 587.1 18.4 5.2
637 1.000 0.000 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.20 0.27 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 790 229.4 8.2 1.5
693 0.567 0.060 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.17 0.29 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 826 227.0 8.0 1.1
540 1.000 0.000 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.28 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 732 109.2 3.0 0.8
695 0.526 0.070 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.18 0.29 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.08 797 349.1 9.7 1.4
665 1.000 0.000 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.20 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 589 358.8 10.0 2.1
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Appendix C
Educational Model Data and Results
Hospital Workload
Code Produced
402
406
436
437
438
442
452
465
460
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
508
609
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
523
525
526
527
528
529
414788
307204
229943
330770
336571
174170
245330
900844
276782
571247
676396
438188
164410
227259
338613
609044
781762
916722
482615
148002
134568
402728
714665
249992
375867
203175
6659081
784727
841711
874949
593866
899900
879896
196912
Outpatient Staff
Visits FTE
9616
8207
2807
6286
7030
4576
9636
23086
9700
19691
18849
5513
4697
10203
8919
17086
21452
18186
8060
12961
3646
12842
32361
4419
18959
4482
12111
14825
24564
29214
22869
44483
29763
6828
41.1
26.4
15.5
17.8
18.5
10.0
15.9
101.4
33.6
60.5
44.7
20.1
12.1
18.8
27.6
53.9
57.1
64.1
37.3
21.0
14.4
39.7
72.2
14.9
40.0
14.1
456.
30.9
86.9
60.8
86.4
128.5
77.3
15.3
Teaching Research Resident Resident Estimated Relative
FTE FTE FTE Equivalent Workload Error
0.0
7.3
0.0
4.8
4.6
0.0
6.1
27.0
7.6
16.3
14.4
0.0
0.0
1.9
0.0
19.6
15.3
19.1
12.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
9.9
0.0
0.0
12.9
18.3
3.9
28.4
20.3
11.3
0.0
0.0
4.2
0.0
1.4
0.3
0.0
1.4
6.0
0.6
8.3
7.1
0.0
0.0
0.2
1.2
18.4
7.4
8.6
8.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.6
0.0
0.0
6.8
15.2
8.1
27.0
14.5
5.5
0.0
5.00
42.00
0.00
28.50
24.00
0.00
16.00
103.50
29.00
77.50
77.00
7.50
0.00
7.00
0.00
73.50
95.00
79.00
88.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
16.00
5.00
0.00
103.00
163.00
76.00
137.00
117.00
85.00
0.00
10.0006
11.6781
10.8225
13.2803
7.2906
-1.8088
15.2252
26.14566
8.7329
4.4914
33.6344
32.3421
34.9658
17.8586
*
10.0215
48.8545
20.2884
31.8584
25.8717
4.7511
21.0433
5668362
378790
263543
314604
326121
141498
210630
1483207
520764
763870
567696
352339
174051
240653
335960
5660626
727292
847778
647567
175494
230598
486614
679712
225221
453327
210890
596995
433761
1151078
600703
913333
1418806
954688
207001
0.37031
0.23302
0.14613
-0.04887
-0.03105
-0.18769
-0.14144
0.64646
0.88832
0.33685
-0.01338
-0.19223
0.05864
0.05894
-0.00783
-0.07960
-0.06968
-0.07420
0.134566
0.18575
0.71362
0.20829
-0.04891
-0.09909
0.20608
0.03797
-0.09420
-0.44725
0.36755
-0.31344
0.53797
0.57663
0.08500
0.05124
II _
259892
360862
227146
433951
587759
878585
449541
554309
345106
1041471
587965
607752
635265
922962
1076938
475352
494501
597707
625991
446318
724419
317973
753493
826508
208458
308410
399117
117566
256740
224955
256977
348558
783384
193368
178983
1326188
228608
1253511
331344
715098
564207
299413
857103
11.8604
24.0493
21.2022
41.2003
38.0849
10.5312
3.1180
31.6317
24.1265
79.4396
74.1328
10.8126
21.8012
45.9614
24.8180
6.9030
56.2939
5.3125
17.3819
37.9487
50.2838
63.8027
9.4504
26.5213
28.2843
46.6869
211855
386677
275392
435834
656762
650142
381833
462213
248368
1342677
692621
498402
548384
821933
535263
506248
695008
717558
451766
400687
972923
384150
475788
1238819
206726
259901
341494
271594
197700
228434
250644
342680
588685
183078
138183
1687396
292591
892457
361564
845825
445904
231672
561752
-0.18484
0.07154
0.21240
0.00434
0.11740
-0.04192
-0.15062
-0.16614
-0.28031
0.28921
0.17800
-0.17993
-0.13676
-0.10946
-0.50298
0.06500
0.05475
0.20052
-0.27832
-0.10228
0.34304
0.20812
-0.36856
0.49886
-0.00830
-0.15729
-0.14438
1.31013
-0.22998
0.00658
-0.02465
-0.01687
-0.22885
-0.05322
-0.22798
0.27237
0.27988
-0.28803
0.09120
-0.09687
-0.20968
-0.22625
-0.34459
-132-
531
532
533
534
535
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
546
549
550
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
561
562
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
573
574
575
578
579
580
581
583
584
585
588
10479
6885
4479
10344
19764
34582
10442
24928
4981
34274
4482
10406
19154
55823
28887
15385
11281
24825
14743
14114
13229
4309
18041
28075
6500
6202
8805
3683
4199
7726
3539
16533
25033
4091
4388
28388
3503
47909
9322
17526
13563
4428
17125
20.6
27.3
19.1
27.5
53.4
63.1
30.8
46.5
16.9
108.6
42.2
30.1
44.4
106.8
57.9
43.8
45.8
65.3
53.8
28.9
64.0
24.4
40.9
98.0
16.0
18.9
26.4
16.9
13.0
18.5
15.5
30.4
55.3
12.0
9.6
114.2
18.0
98.0
25.0
50.3
30.0
15.3
43.5
4.4
0.0
0.0
14.0
12.1
23.4
0.0
18.9
0.0
14.9
5.2
12.5
10.1
54.5
25.2
0.0
16.1
17.9
22.3
15.1
13.4
0.0
24.3
16.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.0
12.6
0.0
0.0
49.1
0.0
23.8
5.2
10.1
5.9
0.0
18.0
4.6
0.0
1.1
3.7
9.3
6.4
0.0
7.0
0.0
8.1
3.2
4.8
3.0
19.8
14.3
0.2
1.8
10.0
27.3
0.0
3.0
0.0
11.5
8.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.5
11.2
0.0
0.0
8.3
0.0
14.5
2.7
8.2
5.2
0.0
5.5
16.00
0.00
4.00
71.00
97.00
116 .00
0.00
84.00
5.00
99.00
12.00
85.00
52.00
153.00
127.00
2.50
41.50
73.00
101.00
38.00
49.00
0.00
111.00
109.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
39.50
100.00
0.00
1.00
180.00
0.00
131.00
30.00
84.25
78.50
0.00
67.00
_1__1_ ______
597928
404050
326712
285647
507593
448563
834636
230192
1430035
193830
1203509
533099
573686
694815
595745
262818
312426
257145
554622
467924
1104786
139938
1235830
214342
657724
488513
244313
294250
841871
262556
686119
846841
286204
704688
724233
552420
671854
868852
437519
547467
760263
355074
622540
26.4117
10.8719
*
41.7378
8.4177
45.4455
82.2562
24.9381
7.9488
33.6352
-0.3164
26.1248
43.2969
83.0757
6.9353
-6.9822
12.6227
59.3149
20.6626
60.4177
20.4283
1.7276
25.7373
35.7927
35.7863
20.1991
28.4131
16.9847
23.9849
26.7398
526798
555109
210452
320623
277459
432363
651490
220708
1047796
287669
1209443
448988
806417
898863
466309
352466
205728
398672
708545
498988
908066
96865
1027044
190221
794831
539610
474709
206285
283720
221607
456598
1596135
384744
876951
791620
430040
475972
942702
421812
857797
717393
320007
512939
-0.11896
0.37386
-0.35585
0.12244
-0.45338
-0.03612
-0.21943
-0.04121
-0.26729
0.48413
0.00493
-0.15778
0.40588
0.51116
-0.21727
0.34111
-0.34151
0.55037
0.27753
0.06638
-0.17806
-0.3b780
-0.16894
-0.11253
0.20846
0.10460
0.94303
-0.29895
-0.66299
-0.15596
-0.33452
0.88481
0.34430
0.24445
0.09305
-0.22153
-0.29155
0.08500
-0.03590
0.58685
-0.05639
-0.09876
-0.17605
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589
590
591
592
594
595
596
597
598
599
800
603
604
605
607
608
609
610
612
613
614
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
626
627
629
630
631
632
635
636
637
640
641
642
644
645
846
18727
18251
6101
4538
5487
9075
14978
7248
30524
8408
59705
14366
5291
21939
9308
9397
8057
4704
30949
13359
20709
2419
25256
5186
11106
9579
5134
14308
25330
11080
42798
39783
13550
32104
11917
14065
12926
26798
3766
26160
24025
636
22233
45.6
45.5
15.8
20.8
19.6
32.4
54.7
14.0
85.0
20.8
115.5
34.8
51.8
64.0
31.2
23.7
17.6
25.7
67.2
41.1
61.6
5.0
98.2
13.6
56.6
31.8
25.3
19.9
35.3
20.7
60.9
119.8
27.0
74.7
58.5
31.2
38.3
87.4
28.3
73.8
59.0
23.1
49.4
11.4
12.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
18.7
2.2
7.9
0.0
57.8
8.7
0.0
16.0
14.6
0.9
0.0
0.0
22.9
0.0
18.0
0.0
50.5
0.0
0.0
2.4
1.5
2.7
12.2
11.0
23.0
45.6
0.4
24.0
27.7
17.6
4.3
19.3
0.0
21.5
13.7
0.0
9.2
7.9
3.9
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.0
14.7
0.0
6.9
0.0
7.1
6.9
0.8
1.0
7.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
7.3
0.1
3.4
0.0
32.5
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.2
7.9
6.1
4.6
4.4
0.0
3.0
11.5
4.4
1.2
18.8
0.2
11.7
1.1
0.1
9.0
75.00
42.00
0.00
0.00
5.00
0.00
82.00
7.00
99.00
2.00
203.00
79.00
5.00
77.00
76.00
10.00
2.00
2.00
91.00
0.00
108.00
0.00
161.00
0.00
2.00
45.00
21.00
19.00
96.00
42.00
05.00
159.00
42.00
79.00
92.00
69.00
10.00
95.50
0.00
109.00
49.00
0.00
77.00
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647 291397 5111 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 165103 -0.43341
648 973940 22427 63.3 27.3 8.7 100.00 52.1111 790441 -0.18841
649 246773 6539 18.6 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 215954 -0.12489
650 356070 27211 45.4 0.0 4.2 58.00 5.9234 401119 0.12652
652 783020 22534 63.5 29.5 13.4 106.00 47.3720 727343 -0.07111
653 314449 6237 19.8 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 274157 -0.12813
654 293699 12862 23.86 .0 0.5 25.00 10.9474 303214 0.03240
655 264084 7324 21.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 274832 0.04078
656 303400 9529 21.7 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 247542 -0.18411
657 1042623 29701 89.9 11.3 12.9 87.00 25.6243 1020018 -0.02168
658 561918 23845 49.4 7.2 0.0 31.50 13.7904 560066 -0.00330
659 545316 13537 44.2 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 548730 0.00626
660 628710 17848 47.7 6.3 0.0 87.50 12.2371 739844 0.17677
662 588137 18057 75.0 14.1 32.5 112.00 23.0047 89680 0.18439
663 520685 22499 54.7 19.9 15.6 85.00 32.8599 507580 -0.02517
684 76688986 35698 57.2 27.9 17.6 135.00 69.3386 373268 -0.51332
665 553434 32893 77.8 31.5 23.0 100.00 41.8258 609488 0.10128
666 187201 3038 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 201634 0.07710
667 695817 15413 28.8 15.1 3.8 45.50 45.2013 327375 -0.52951
668 293756 7366 17.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 207990 -0.29196
670 436386 18018 29.8 19.7 6.3 71.50 38.3802 320807 -0.26486
671 1084495 32532 52.0 30.0 12.9 127.00 87.7771 401333 -0.62994
673 998782 41858 79.8 27.8 7.2 119.50 56.6355 784883 -0.21416
674 798119 18174 55.2 10.1 0.6 29.50 16.5370 805370 0.00909
676 331489 5710 19.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 270224 -0.18482
677 617364 19537 38.4 1.8 1.8 18.00 19.9517 396092 -0.35841
678 565543 21806 47.7 17.1 7.6 69.00 30.8221 514871 -0.08960
679 369022 6190 18.5 0.0 0.0 3.00 * 253502 -0.31304
680 559046 1058 41.3 1.6 0.0 7.00 -8.1833 784431 0.40316
685 506711 12556 48.6 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 605678 0.19531
686 355534 3281 28.5 0.0 0.2 1.00 * 467067 0.31370
687 184983 3403 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 * 178677 -0.03409
688 718188 29717 94.9 17.0 11.9 141.00 5.7088 1196674 0.66624
689 517005 14011 60.7 36.2 8.6 109.00 26.8857 916021 0.77178
690 * * 0.0 * 0.00 * * *
691 1173587 65753 135.4 52.9 32.3 191.00 87.4938 1023491 -0.12788
893 464600 25665 46.5 5.3 0.0 25.00 10.8422 478020 0.02889
895 811304 35700 91.8 39.5 20.8 114.00 52.4237 889027 0.07115
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Appendix D
Chain YYY Budgets Using Different Algorithms
Column Definitions
Previous Budget
Budget Std.Dev.
10%. Prop. Incr.
Minimum Risk Budget
Minimum Risk %Inc.
Eq._Probability Budget
Eq._Probability %Inc.
Eff.Adjusted Budget
Eff.Adjusted %Inc.
Hosp. Previous Budget 10% Pro,
Code Budget Std.Dev. Incr.
402 43940
405 12269
436 20045
437 58821
438 30058
442 28049
452 32783
455 32611
460 13418
500 47943
501 27482
502 49052
503 38694
504 20800
505 26796
2220.1
1265.2
1067.2
3667.2
1108.2
1108.7
1617.3
1254.1
2258.3
2674.4
1936.2
7478.5
1802.1
837.8
2215.3
48334
13496
22050
64703
33064
30854
36081
35873
14760
52737
30230
53958
42584
22879
29475
: Total Direct Patient-Care Budget in
Previous Year.
: Standard Deviation of Previous Budget.
: Budget Allocated with a 10% Increase
over Previous Year.
: Budget Allocated Using the Minimum-Risk
Algorithm.
: Proportion of Increase from Previous Year.
: Budget Allocated Using the Equal-Probability
Algorithm.
: Proportion of Increase from Previous Year.
: Budget Allocated MOO Efficiency to Adjust a
Minimum
: Proportion of
P.
Risk Budget.
Increase from Previous Year.
MinimumRisk Eq._Probability Eff.Adjusted
Budget %Inc. Budget %Inc. Budget %Inc.
46665
13783
21408
63363
31421
29411
34751
34125
16296
51274
29905
58439
40965
21859
29521
0.062
0.123
0.068
0.077
0.046
0.049
0.060
0.046
0.214
0.069
0.088
0.191
0.059
0.051
0.102
46817
13934
21408
63363
31572
29563
34903
34277
16296
51274
29906
58288
40965
21859
29672
0.065
0.136
0.068
0.077
0.050
0.054
0.065
0.051
0.214
0.069
0.088
0.188
0.059
0.051
0.107
45303
13028
20727
81092
30739
28730
40270
33368
14857
49608
28693
82884
47082
24713
28158
0.03102
0.06170
0.03400
0.03861
0.02266
0.02428
0.22837
0.02320
0.10722
0.03473
0.04406
0.68971
0.21678
0.18815
0.05084
506 38240 2608.3 42064 41571 0.087 41571 0.087 39905 0.04354
_
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508
509
512
513
514
515
516
517
S18
519
520
S21
522
523
625
S26
527
628
529
531
532
S33
534
536
537
538
539
540
S41
642
543
644
546
549
550
552
5563
554
5as
56
557
558
661
52674
46337
25161
31954
51605
24624
110123
30741
46001
14333
59631
42753
15682
6312S
121177
60166
124109
86953
68450
20775
25184
25674
31256
50691
7581
69988
32978
57519
43004
12477
49137
66256
59743
61560
38212
43304
36219
35167
47304
57587
47239
48268
83716
2183.3
1419.7
1672.7
1949.3
7533.6
7442.1
5868.8
1206.8
15397.8
583.2
5056.4
1617.1
958.5
3603.1
30977.4
2780.9
8878.5
4115.1
5829.0
1010.8
4341.7
1447.1
3131.4
1633.4
2371.7
5600.8
1519.7
5408.7
5011.8
2171.7
3473.5
12688.7
3295.2
1639.4
3595.7
2610.1
1076.1
1283.9
1525.3
7976.5
275S.4
13B4.1
5871.3
57942
50971
27677
35150
56765
27087
121135
33815
50601
1576787
6594
47028
17260
69438
133295
66182
136520
95648
75296
22852
27702
28241
34381
55760
83139
76987
36276
B3271
47305
13725
54051
71781
65718
67716
42033
47635
39841
38683
52035
63346
61963
63095
92087
55399
48154
27280
34377
60991
34011
117390
32255
6380
15090
65990
44721
16893
67516
160088
63648
135162
92101
75717
21986
30634
27491
35192
52659
78609
78953
34946
64332
49212
16202
53528
81152
63831
63528
42754
46484
37581
36832
49272
67580
50721
49933
91134
0.052
0.039
0.084
0.076
0.182
0.381
0.066
0.049
0.421
0.053
0.107
0.046
0.077
0.070
0.321
0.058
0.089
0.059
O.l108B
0.058
0.216
0.071
0.128
0.039
0.040
0.100
0.060
0.118
0.144
0.218
0.089
0.244
0.068
0.032
0.119
0.073
0.038
0.047
0.042
0.174
0.074
0.035
0.089
55399
48154
27280
34377
60991
33860
117390
32255
66077
16090
65990
44873
16893
67516
169483
63648
135162
92101
75717
22138
30634
27491
35192
62811
78609
769653
34946
64332
49212
15202
53528
81001
63831
63679
42754
46484
37581
36832
49272
67428
50721
0.052
0.039
0.084
0.076
0.182
0.375
0.066
0.049
0.415
0.053
0.107
0.050
0.077
0.070
0.316
0.058
0.089
0.059
O.l10B
0.066
0.216
0.071
0.126
0.042
0.040
0.100
0.060
0.118
0.144
0.218
0.089
0.241
0.068
0.034
0.119
0.073
0.038
0.047
0.042
0.171
0.074
54037 0.02587
47246 0.01961
26220 0.04211
33166 0.03792
85678 0.68028
57888 1.35085
137309 0.24687
31498 0.02462
55690 0.21063
17066 0.19067
62810 0.05331
43737 0.02302
20125 0.28337
65320 0.03477
140633 0.16058
61907 0.02894
129636 0.04453
89527 0.02960
72084 0.05309
21381 0.02917
27909 0.10822
26582 0.03538
33224 0.06298
51675 0.01941
77020 0.01904
73471 0.04976
33962 0.02985
82282 0.43051
46108 0.07217
13840 0.10924
51333 0.04469
73204 0.12181
75005 0.25545
62544 0.01599
40483 0.05943
44894 0.03671
38900 0.01881
35999 0.02367
48288 0.02080
62683 0.08675
48980 0.03686
49101 0.01726
87425 0.04431
50086 0.038
90983 0.087
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562 29020 1134.1 31922 30383 0.047 30534 0.052 29701 0.02347
564 43483 1435.0 47831 45300 0.042 45300 0.042 50197 0.15442
565 57011 2219.3 62712 59738 0.048 59888 0.050 58374 0.02391
566 40368 5280.7 44405 47030 0.165 46878 0.161 43699 0.08251
567 26314 5488.2 28945 33127 0.259 33127 0.259 29720 0.12945
568 11947 573.0 13142 12704 0.063 12704 0.063 12328 0.03169
569 43956 2772.1 48352 47438 0.079 47438 0.079 56772 0.29157
570 23931 1049.3 26325 25294 0.057 25294 0.057 24613 0.02848
573 45479 1399.1 50027 47298 0.040 47296 0.040 46312 0.01831
574 29838 1674.8 32822 31957 0.071 31957 0.071 30898 0.03553
575 16542 796.9 18198 17601 0.064 17601 0.064 20281 0.22805
578 78885 4328.6 86773 84335 0.069 84335 0.069 81610 0.03455
579 32013 1719.0 35215 34133 0.066 34133 0.066 39977 0.24877
580 126732 5866.6 139405 133999 0.057 133999 0.057 130365 0.02867
581 27116 1212.4 29828 28830 0.056 28630 0.056 27873 0.02791
583 60018 2896.8 66020 83652 0.081 63652 0.061 61835 0.03027
584 26399 1001.7 29038 27610 0.046 27761 0.052 27004 0.02293
585 37569 1440.9 41326 39386 0.048 39386 0.048 44300 0.17914
588 68822 1677.7 75705 70942 0.031 70942 0.031 69882 0.01540
589 29031 1105.7 31934 30393 0.047 30545 0.052 29712 0.02347
590 34769 1930.6 38246 37192 0.070 37192 0.070 35980 0.03482
591 63877 4702.6 70264 69781 0.092 69781 0.092 66829 0.04622
592 17438 4181.7 19181 22737 0.304 22737 0.304 20087 0.15194
594 101261 4943.7 111387 107488 0.061 107468 0.061 124251 0.22704
595 29542 2544.3 32497 32722 0.108 32722 0.108 31132 0.05380
5986 81592 3454.8 87751 65983 0.071 65983 0.071 63787 0.03564
597 18368 989.8 20203 19578 0.068 19729 0.074 18972 0.03297
598 42809 1292.5 47090 44475 0.039 44475 0.039 43642 0.01945
599 28855 2675.9 31740 32185 0.115 32185 0.115 30520 0.05772
600 103537 3340.9 113891 107625 0.039 107776 0.041 105581 0.01974
603 45307 1548.7 49837 47275 0.043 47275 0.043 46291 0.02173
604 92859 44811.1 102145 149029 0.605 148120 0.595 121020 0.30327
605 50607 2578.0 55687 53788 0.063 53788 0.083 52196 0.03141
607 39732 1310.4 43705 41398 0.042 41398 0.042 40565 0.02096
608 34801 1895.5 38281 36921 0.061 36921 0.061 42682 0.22646
609 45899 1230.0 50488 47413 0.033 47564 0.036 46656 0.01650
810 28808 5992.1 3188 36377 0.283 36226 0.258 32592 0.13137
611 31054 2241.9 34159 33931 0.093 33931 0.093 32492 0.04631
612 53787 3377.8 59166 58026 0.079 58026 0.079 55906 0.03940
613 102811 6499.9 113092 110986 0.080 110835 0.078 106899 0.03976
614 97088 2033.5 106797 99662 0.027 99662 0.027 106612 0.09809
617 208689 1459.1 22956 22686 0.087 22686 0.087 27600 0.32251
618 92529 3402.1 101782 96768 0.046 96768 0.046 94649 0.02291
I  I_ _I _ _ _ ___
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619 28298
620 115256
621 56343
622 6434
623 30009
626 70415
627 26519
629 69801
630 121943
B31 15781
632 89412
635 42645
636 59S15
637 60436
640 25346
641 62994
642 38621
644 72893
645 17195
646 55538
647 45545
648 88546
649 32500
650 34173
652 26694
653 26988
654 22856
655 S0435
666 17019
657 66918
658 30797
659 52853
660 32299
662 31697
663 29908
664 48700
665 45193
666 7994
667 51893
668 38486
670 40564
671 113079
673 86457
2810.6
23586.8
1817.4
1302.7
1492.7
3131.B
2681.9
3167.1
14998.7
1145.5
9571.7
1595.3
4350.2
2712.4
2357.8
10159.9
1853.2
3150.5
8612.8
4258.0
1283.9
2299.2
2878.5
1540.2
787.5
1131.2
1573.7
3830.0
4344.2
4116.9
2477.1
7293.5
1149.4
1287.4
1143.4
2269.1
4888.3
2072.7
2013.0
1448.3
2327.B
5608.1
5883.5
31127
126782
61977
5978
33010
77457
29171
76782
134137
17359
98364
48909
65487
66480
27880
89293
42483
80183
18914
61091
50100
97400
35760
37590
29363
29687
25142
65478
18721
73610
33877
58138
356529
34867
32898
63670
49713
8793
57082
42335
44621
12438B
96102
31780
144780
68614
7100
31826
74352
29850
73738
140716
17143
101373
44613
64986
63767
28374
76711
40892
78830
27944
60837
47211
91422
36133
3B141
27602
28360
24825
5S280
22469
72066
33976
61937
33662
33383
31270
51576
51098
10568
54467
40303
43441
120043
93875
0.123
0.256
0.040
0.306
0.081
0.056
0.126
0.056
0.154
0.088
0.134
0.046
0.092
0.055
0.119
0.202
0.059
0.054
0.625
0.096
0.037
0;.032
0.112
0.068
0.034
0.050
0.088
0.096
0.320
0.077
0.103
0.172
0.042
0.063
0.046
0.059
0.131
0.322
0.050
0.047
0.071
0.062
0.086
31780 0.123 30039 0.06153
144325 0.252 130018 0.12808
58614 0.040 57478 0.0201S
7100 0.306 6267 0.15326
31978 0.066 30918 0.03027
74352 0.068 72383 0.02795
29850 0.126 28184 0.06279
73738 0.058 71770 0.02820
140565 0.153 131330 0.07698
17295 0.096 16462 0.04318
101221 0.132 96393 0.06689
44613 0.046 43629 0.02308
84966 0.092 62240 0.04578
63918 0.058 62101 0.02755
28374 0.119 26860 0.05975
75S60 0.199 69353 0.10095
41044 0.063 39757 0.02941
76830 0.054 74862 0.02701
27944 0.625 22569 0.31255
60837 0.095 58187 0.04771
47211 0.037 51586 0.13264
91422 0.032 89984 0.01625
36133 0.112 34316 0.0556689
36141 0.058 41365 0.2104S
27753 0.040 27148 0.01702
28502 0.0O6 27669 0.02524
24826 0.088 23840 0.04304
55280 0.096 68096 0.35018
22469 0.320 19744 0.16012
7206S 0.077 69492 0.03847
33978 0.103 32387 0.05163
81937 0.172 85890 0.62507
33813 0.047 32980 0.02109
33363 0.053 32530 0.02627
31422 0.061 30589 0.02278
51576 0.059 50138 0.02963
51098 0.131 48145 0.06532
10568 0.322 17268 1.16009
64467 0.050 53180 0.02480
40303 0.047 39394 0.02359
43441 0.071 42003 0.03546
120043 0.062 139082 0.22996
93724 0.084 113819 0.31417
-139-
674 111118 11176.7 122230 125047 0.125 124895 0.124 118158 0.06336
676 22189 4079.3 24408 27337 0.232 27337 0.232 24763 0.11599
677 36898 4271.4 40588 42197 0.144 42197 0.144 39548 0.07182
678 32218 1295.8 35439 33883 0.052 33883 0.052 33050 0.02584
679 26098 7496.0 28708 35485 0.360 35485 0.360 30791 0.17982
680 35807 2708.3 39388 39138 0.093 39289 0.097 37473 0.04652
685 26878 2130.3 29563 29601 0.101 29601 0.101 28238 0.05069
686 40092 2185.3 44102 42818 0.068 42818 0.068 50221 0.25264
687 26108 1285.1 28718 27773 0.064 27773 0.064 26940 0.03188
688 81970 3028.5 90187 85755 0.048 85755 0.048 83863 0.02309
689 45484 4688.5 50032 51389 0.130 51389 0.130 86930 0.47151
690 23581 1879.2 25939 26003 0.103 26003 . 0.103 24792 0.05136
691 57002 3421.9 62702 61241 0.074 81241 0.074 59121 0.03718
693 64354 4723.7 70790 70259 0.092 70259 0.092 67307 0.04588
695 47115 1763.4 51827 49388 0.048 49386 0.048 48251 0.02410
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